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Abstract
The primary purpose of the air traffic management system (ATM) is to organize and expedite the
flow of traffic and to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system [1]. However,
in recent years, air traffic management systems have faced increasing levels of air traffic. As the
airspace has become more congested and ATM operational errors have become problematic,
there has been increasing motivation to improve the efficiency and safety of the air traffic
management process by investigating the use of automation technologies.
One key characteristic of an automated air traffic management system is the ability to
perform automated aircraft traffic separation management. In order to improve safety and
efficiency, conflict detection and conflict resolution processes that are within the separation
management system need to be robust in an uncertain environment.
The issue of an uncertain environment in the separation management has been tackled in
a number of different ways, but in this thesis, we aim to focus on the impact of different
measurement uncertainty models on the estimated risk of conflict, where the risk of conflict
is considered as a primary measurement to be used for early conflict detection. Measurement
uncertainty models can be used to represent different sensor accuracy and sensor choices.
This thesis demonstrates the value of modelling measurement uncertainty in the conflict risk
estimation problem and presents techniques for assessing sensor requirements to achieve desired
conflict detection performance.
Additional insights into the uncertain environment problem were brought forth by a compar-
ison of separation performance behavior of several popular algorithms in an uncertain commu-
nication environment. In this study, uncertain communication environments will be represented
by periods of information loss. In this thesis, a comparison is initially conducted through
simulation studies, then followed by flight tests. Simulation results suggest that communication
iii
failure can cause the performance of these separation management algorithms to degrade sig-
nificantly. To overcome the degraded performance problems in uncertain environments, a new
type of automated separation management algorithm that utilizes inter-aircraft communication
and a track file manager (or bank of Kalman filters) is proposed. The proposed separation
management algorithm is tested in a range of flight scenarios during periods of communication
failure, in both simulation and flight test (flight tests were conducted as part of the Smart Skies
project1). The purpose of flight tests was to investigate the benefits of using inter-aircraft com-
munication to provide an extra layer of safety protection in support of air traffic management
during periods of failure of the communication network. The ability of the proposed separation
management system to resolve potential conflict during a period of central communication
failure is confirmed.
This thesis achieves its overall aim of investigating the impact of uncertain environment on
air traffic management systems.
1Refer to website for details: http://www.arcaa.net/research/smart-skies-project/
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In recent years, air traffic management systems have faced increasing levels of air traffic. With
air traffic expected to grow from roughly 45,000 daily flights to 61,000 daily flights in the next
ten years, there is increasing motivation to improve the efficiency of the air traffic management
process. Air traffic demand has resulted in increased air traffic density. Increased air traffic
density, on one hand increases the traffic throughput, but on the other hand will affect the safety
of aircraft operations due to the increased risk of air traffic conflicts. Prevot [4] indicates that
if current airspace operations remain unchanged, increasing traffic demands are expected to
compromise both on-time performance and safety. The aim of this research is to investigate air
traffic management safety and efficiency through evaluation of impacts of uncertainty on risk
of air traffic conflicts and air traffic separation management performance.
The air traffic management system (ATM) aims firstly to organize the flow of traffic and
to prevent a collision between aircraft operating in the system [1]. In many countries, ATM
services are provided throughout the majority of airspace, and its services are available to
all users. When controllers are responsible for separating some or all aircraft, such airspace
is called “controlled airspace” in contrast to “uncontrolled airspace” where aircraft may fly
without the use of the ATM. Depending on the type of flight and the class of airspace, Air traffic
controllers (ATC) may issue instructions that pilots are required to follow, or merely issue flight
information to assist pilots operating in the airspace.
The major problems faced by the ATM system looking into the future will be primarily
1
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related to the volume of air traffic demand placed on the system, with an expected 3%-5% air
traffic growth rate for the next 10 years [5]. Current solutions to congestion problems have
included building more facilities, hiring more controllers and expanding existing air traffic
control technologies. These patchwork solutions have been only marginally effective, at a huge
cost. Automation technologies greatly improve the efficiency of the air traffic management
process. However, automation technologies have been mostly relegated to an advisory role
in the current ATM systems. For example, Ground based systems such as TRUST (Terminal
Routing Using Speed Control Techniques), FAST (Final Approach Spacing Tool) and CTAS
(Centre TRACON Automation System) assist human controllers by providing sequencing and
vectoring information. AILS (Airborne Information for Lateral Spacing) and TCAS (Traffic
and Collision Avoidance System) alerts pilots about potential collisions and advise procedural
maneuvers. Automated air traffic management will play a crucial role in the next generation air
traffic management systems.
Boarder automation approaches for safer and more efficient air traffic systems are currently
being developed with the support of various governments and industry partners. Two examples
of these programs are the SESAR project in Europe and the NextGen project in US. These
two projects are different in scope. However, they share the common understanding of future
air traffic management capability, which is to include automated functions to assist air traffic
controllers in decision making as well as providing situation awareness to all aircraft. The
concept of situation awareness is generally accepted as referring to the perception of elements
in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and
the projection of their status in the near future. However, if these automated concepts are to be
adopted, some of the safeguards, which were built according to the old operational procedures,
will no longer exist. Therefore, a higher level of assurance for safety will be required for these
systems.
Automated air traffic management also plays an important part in the UAV industry. In the
past few years, technology involving UAVs has experienced rapid growth, applications emerg-
ing in areas such as military combat, surveillance, reconnaissance, and many more. However,
the potential of UAV technology cannot be fully realised until this technology is proven to
have the ability to operate safely in civilian airspace with other types of aircraft. In fact, it has
been proposed by Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and other civil aviation regulatory bodies
including Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA), that UAV must demonstrate an equivalent
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level of safety to that of manned aircraft. Without such evidence of guaranteed performance,
aviation regulation authorities (CASA, FAA, JAA, etc.) are unlikely to agree to let UAVs fly
in the same airspace as other aircraft. This provides an additional motivation to develop an
automated air traffic management system, as it will not only prevent aircraft collisions within
the defined airspace, but also help provide safe trajectories for UAVs.
1.1.1 Current Separation Management Approach Problem
Safety in air traffic management is generally understood to involve five layers of safety pro-
cesses and systems that are shown in the Figure 1.1. These five layers provide multiple levels of
collision protection and, as such, each of these layers would have to fail in order for a mid-air
collision to occur. This layered approach starts in Layer 1 which contains the basic procedures
and structures of airspace management (aspects such as predefined operational altitudes and
predefined flight routes) that provide the basic framework for air-traffic operation. In the 2nd
and 3rd layers, a centrally located air traffic management system (human operators and ground-
based radar systems) performs aircraft traffic separation management. Layers 4 and 5 relate
to emergency safety systems. This thesis is specifically focused on (automated) separation
management (in the 2nd and 3rd layers) which has the task of maintaining safe separation
distances between aircraft and, in the event of a potential conflict arising, this system also has
the task of resolving conflicts in a safe manner.
One key characteristic of an automated air traffic management system is the ability to
perform automated aircraft traffic separation management. During the operation of air traf-
fic separation management processes, the traffic environment must be first monitored, then
appropriate aircraft state information must be collected and disseminated using sensors and
appropriate communication equipment. The collected state information provides an estimate
of the current traffic situation. However, there is generally some uncertainty in the values of
the collected aircraft states. In order to improve the safety and efficiency of the separation
management system, conflict detection and conflict resolution processes within the separation
management system need to be robust to account for uncertainty in the values collected for each
aircraft state.
Most proposed automated separation management approaches over the last decades assume
an exact knowledge of all aircraft state. However, in realistic environments where uncertainty
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Figure 1.1: Safety in air traffic management
exists, these idealized assumptions are not valid. Furthermore, uncertainties which are common
in realistic environments can potentially lead to information mishandling in the separation man-
agement process, increasing the risk of mid-air collision. The uncertainty in aircraft location and
states can occur due to various reasons, including measurement noise and special cases when
communication failure occurs. One of the possible sources of uncertainty from measurement
noise is due to sensor accuracy. While it has been demonstrated that high measurement noise
in sensors does have an effect on separation management performance [6], the level of impact
from different sensor accuracy and sensor choices on the risk of conflict is yet to be determined.
Communication failure events can also be treated as special cases of measurement uncertainty.
They occur when communication equipment breaks down or when there is congestion in the
communication network. Thus, there is an urgent need for new automated ATM systems with
robust behavior against uncertainties within realistic environments.
To address the issue of automated ATM taking into account uncertainty, this thesis inves-
tigates different types of uncertainty in air traffic management and concentrate on quantifying
risk of conflict from uncertainty in measurement information which occurs consistently. In
addressing the issue, the thesis proposes and tries to provide an answer to the following research
questions.
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1.2 Research Questions
Question 1: How does some information about measurement uncertainty (such as sensor ac-
curacy and choices) impacts the quality of our estimates of the risk of mid-air collision? The
following sub question is also considered:
(i) If additional information about uncertainty (sensors) helps to reduce the risk, does it
perform differently in different conflict scenarios?
Another problem regarding the uncertainty in air traffic management system is in the area of
communication uncertainty. This uncertainty can be treated as a special case of measurement
uncertainty when the measurement is invalid and cannot be used. This leads to the second
research question:
Question 2: Can inter-aircraft communication be used to improve separation performance
in uncertain communication environments (e.g. communication failure)? The following sub-
questions are considered:
(i) If low-bandwidth communication between nearby aircraft is assumed, can requested in-
formation be used to reduce uncertainty?
(ii) Can an integrated solution based on the triggering concept or low bandwidth inter-aircraft
communication be build? What possible issues can arise using this approach?
1.3 Research Objectives
The main objective of this research is to investigate separation management approaches that are
robust and mitigate uncertainty in sensor or communication failure raised by the next generation
of air traffic management approaches. We have identified the following sub-objectives:
1. Identify several types of uncertainty issues and determine a realistic representation of
uncertainty in a simulation environment.
2. Investigate the influence of measurement uncertainty on the risk of conflict.
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3. Identify the key elements and metrics to determine the performance of separation man-
agement approaches. Compare the performance with existing approaches.
4. Investigate novel separation management approaches that mitigate uncertainty in com-
munication based on requesting information via inter-aircraft communication link.
1.4 Key Contributions of Research
The significant original contribution of the thesis are:
• Knowledge:
– Influence of measurement choices on estimated risk of conflict is explained.
– Influence of measurement accuracy on estimated risk of conflict is explained.
– The impact on risk ratio of variation in the accuracy of different types of sensor
information (e.g. Radar range, radar bearing, radar elevation, etc.)
– Sensor accuracy requirement derived from a risk of conflict modelling.
• Tools and Methods:
– The use of more general aircraft models to represent the aircraft dynamics in the
problem of estimating the risk of conflict.
– A methodology for realizing the risk of conflict benefits by combining ADS-B and
radar measurements.
– Use of particle filters in determining the risk ratio of a particular situation to a
nominal situation.
– Using risk ratio in determining impact on risk of conflict from measurement accu-
racy.
• Outputs:
– A new risk-ratio based approach for assessing the impact of sensor accuracy and
sensor choice on the ability to accurately predict conflicts is presented.
– Comparisons of the impact of communication loss on several existing automated
separation management approaches.
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– A new safety augmentation system using a decentralised separation management
system that involves a track file manager, an on-board conflict detection system, and
a separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach is proposed.
The outcomes of this research will help to understand automated air traffic management
system operating in realistic environments. Automated ATM systems not only offer potential
benefits to the general aviation industry but may also facilitate Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
entering service in civilian airspace.
1.5 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2 introduces the mathematical framework which will be used in the later chapters and
provides the mathematic language in which the research problems are posed. Chapter 2 first
details the aircraft dynamic models which include both three degree-of-freedom (3DOF) model
and six degree-of-freedom (6DOF) model. The chapter then describes the aircraft measurement
models, briefly introduces the particle filtering techniques and Kalman filtering techniques
used in this thesis. The second half of Chapter 2 contains necessary mathematic background
information on satisficing separation management approach and the Decentralized Reactive
Collision Avoidance approach (DRCA).
Chapter 3 provides a literature review of aircraft conflict risk modelling tools. Chapter 3
first defines the concept of risk of conflict and other related terms, then the chapter discusses
different risk of conflict models. Next, the chapter explains other aspects of the problem such
as conflict risk estimation. Finally, Chapter 3 provides a summary of the literature review on
the topic of conflict risk.
Chapter 4 presents an overview of separation management approaches used for air traffic
management. Chapter 4 first defines the concept of automated aircraft separation manage-
ment and other related terms. Then the chapter compares different separation management
approaches in two different categories: centralized separation management and decentralized
separation management. Finally, a comprehensive summary of the literature findings related
to separation management system approaches and their robustness towards uncertainty is pre-
sented.
Chapter 5 proposes a novel approach to assessing the impact of different measurement
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uncertainty models on the estimated risk of conflict. Chapter 5 first discusses the existing
uncertainty problem in separation management, it then introduces the risk of conflict model.
Later, Chapter 5 discusses the methodology used in modelling risk of conflict and compares
different sets of sensor configurations using risk ratio concept: Range, bearing, longitude and
latitude accuracy. Chapter 5 then evaluates the benefit of using additional sensor information to
better quantify the risk of conflict and presents three different test cases. Finally, a comparative
analysis of the simulation results is presented.
Chapter 6 examines and evaluates the separation performance behavior of several algo-
rithms. Chapter 6 first examines the separation performance of the algorithms in an uncertain
communication environment where periods of communication breakdown occur. Then the
chapter discusses the communication uncertainty problem and compares the separation perfor-
mance through simulation studies. These simulation studies suggest that communication failure
can cause the performance of these separation management approaches to degrade significantly.
Chapter 7 proposes a new type of automated separation management algorithm that utilizes
inter-aircraft communication and a track file manager that is capable of resolving conflicts in an
uncertain communication environment where periods of communication failure occur. Chapter
7 first details the proposed separation management algorithm in a range of flight scenarios in a
simulation study. Then Chapter 7 discusses the conducted flight test environment and flight test
results. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes that the proposed separation management system was able
to resolve potential conflict during a period of central communication failure with the help of
inter-aircraft communication.
Chapter 8 provides the main conclusions of thesis with some recommendations for fu-
ture work, where a measurement and communication uncertainty model can potentially be
incorporated into separation management approaches to strengthen the safety aspects of future
automatic air traffic management system in regard to uncertainties.
Chapter 2
Background Material: Dynamics, Estimation, and
Separation Management Mathematics
Chapter 2 introduces the mathematical framework and provides the mathematical language
which will be used in the following chapters. This mathematical framework includes models of
aircraft dynamics, aircraft measurement process models, filtering techniques and mathematical
background of separation management approaches. The chapter is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2.1 describe the aircraft models. Section 2.2 describe the measurement models. Section 2.3
describes the filtering techniques. Section 2.4 details the filtering techniques in aircraft conflict
problems. Section 2.5 describes the mathematical background for some of the separation
management approaches. Section 2.6 draws some conclusions.
2.1 Aircraft Dynamic Models
Aircraft dynamic models are the basis for all aircraft simulations. There are two types of aircraft
dynamic models involved in this project: 3DOF and 6DOF.
2.1.1 Aircraft 3DOF Models
3DOF Aircraft models are used in the simulations throughout the thesis. 3DOF models are used
for representing simple 2D kinematics of aircraft. In a 3DOF aircraft model, the dynamics of
9
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Figure 2.1: Aircraft 3DOF representation
ith aircraft can be represented using simple 2D kinematics, see Figure 2.1.
d
dt

xi
yi
ψi

=

si cos(ψi)
si sin(ψi)
ui

(2.1)
Where si is the speed of ith aircraft, ψi is bearing angle of ith aircraft and ui is the heading
change of ith aircraft. In a 3DOF aircraft model, xi is defined as the longitude of ith aircraft. yi
is defined as the latitude of ith aircraft.This can then be further discretised with a sampling time
Ts
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + Tssi cos(ψi(k))
yi(k + 1) = yi(k) + Tssi sin(ψi(k))
ψi(k + 1) = ψi(k) + ui
(2.2)
The inputs are restricted to a constrained domain by the limitation of vehicle: ui,min ≤ ui ≤
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Figure 2.2: Aircraft 6DOF representation
ui,max.
2.1.2 Aircraft 6DOF Models
6DOF Aircraft models are used in the C172 aircraft simulator which developed by the Univer-
sity of Sheffield. The C172 simulator will be used in our flight tests to simulate the dynamics of
the aircraft. The 6DOF equations arise from understanding the equations of motion that govern
an aircraft, these equations describe how the state of the aircraft dependents on the aerodynamic
forces, moments and thrust that act on the aircraft. These forces and moments are driven by the
control surface deflections, aircraft geometry, mass properties, and airflow about the body of
aircraft. The following list and Figure 2.2 contains the notation that are used in the equations.
U : True airspeed, forward direction
V : True airspeed, starboard direction
W : True airspeed, down direction
θ: Pitch angle
ψ: Yaw angle
ϕ: Roll angle
g0: Local level gravity constant
r: Angular yaw rate
p: Angular roll rate
q: Angular pitch rate
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The equation are written in terms of the body frame translational velocity vector components
(U, V,W ), body frame angular velocity vector components (p, q, r), gravity (g), external forces
(Fx, Fy, Fz) and body mass (m).
d
dt

U
V
W

=

rV − qW − g0 sin θ + Fxm
−rU + pW + g0 sinϕ cos θ + Fym
qU − pV + g0 cosϕ cos θ + Fzm

(2.3)
These forces are often characterized in the form of dimensionless coefficients, understand-
ing and being able to characterize these dimensionless aerodynamic coefficients is the main
problem in the development of the mathematical 6DOF model. Expressions for these dimen-
sionless aerodynamic coefficients are not the focus of this project. Further details on 6DOF and
how to obtain these dimensionless coefficients can be found in [7].
2.2 Aircraft Measurement Models
Aircraft measurement models are used to model the measurements obtained through various
sensors. In this thesis, aircraft is classified into two basic types, observer aircraft and target
aircraft. By convention, the observer aircraft is the first aircraft (1) in the description, with the
state of the observer aircraft denoted as x1t ∈ R4. N targets within the target aircraft set are
denoted as TN := {2, ..., N + 1}. Each target aircraft r ∈ TN , is described by:
x˙rt = f(x
r
t ) + v
r
t ,
(2.4)
where xrt ∈ R4 is the target aircraft state. xrt (q) denotes the qth element of the state of target
aircraft r. Here xrt =
[
xrt (1) x
r
t (2) x
r
t (3) x
r
t (4)
]>
, where xrt (1) and x
r
t (3) denote x, y
directions respectively and xrt (2) = x˙
r
t (1), x
r
t (4) = x˙
r
t (3). Here f(·) : R4 → R4 are the system
dynamics. vrt is the system process noise with the densities being ψv. The observer aircraft is
an aircraft that has the capability of measuring the relative bearing and range information of
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another aircraft. The measurement models of the aircraft is:
yrt = h(x
r
t ) + u
r
t ,
(2.5)
Here yrt ∈ RQ is the target aircraft observation, and Q is the dimension of measurement
variables. Here h(·) : RQ → RQ is the measurement process. The process noise vrt and the
measurement noise urt are assumed to be mutually uncorrelated, with the densities of measure-
ment noise being ψu.
Four measurement models were used in this thesis. The first measurement uncertainty model
is based on bearing only information, the second measurement uncertainty model is based
on both range and bearing information (radar observation), the third measurement uncertainty
model is based on latitude and longitude information from automatic dependent surveillance-
boardcast (ADS-B), and the forth measurement uncertainty model is based on range, bearing,
latitude and longitude information (Radar + ADS-B). Here, range and bearing angle information
are measured through a single sensor (radar). The range and bearing transformations are
given by r =
√
x2 + y2, and θ = arctan(y/x) respectively. Within these four models, the
longitude and latitude information is obtained through ADS-B which are represented by x
and y respectively. The sensor measurement noise wk is assumed to follow a white Gaussian
distribution with zero mean. The values in the covariance matrix represent the accuracy of
the sensors, both nominal ADS-B noise standard deviation for latitude and longitude position
measurements as well as nominal radar range and bearing errors are derived from Required
Navigation Performance of 1 nautical miles (RNP-1). RNP is used as navigation specification
that includes requirement for on-board performance monitoring and alerting.)
2.3 Filtering Techniques
Filtering techniques are needed in this work to estimate aircraft states from the observation.
The filtering problem is a mathematical model for a number of filtering problems in signal
processing. The general idea is to form an estimate for the true value of some system, given
only some (potentially noisy) observations of that system. Here we will briefly introduce the
particle filtering techniques and Kalman filtering techniques that are related to this thesis.
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2.3.1 Particle Filtering
Let us consider the case of tracking N target aircraft. For this purpose, we allocate a set of M
particles to each tracked target aircraft r. The states for themth particle that tracks target aircraft
r is denoted by xm,rk . The particle filters first initialise all M particles based on the initial target
aircraft state’s probability density function (PDF). The particle filter then iterates the following
four steps every time instant k [8]:
(i) Measurement update
(ii) Estimation
(iii) Resampling
(iv) Time update
2.3.1.1 Measurement Update
For particle number m = 1, 2, ...,M , find the weighting coefficient wm,rk|k :
wm,rk|k =
1
ck
wm,rk|k−1p(y
r
k|xm,rk ), (2.6)
where ck is the normalization weight given by:
ck =
M∑
m=1
wm,rk|k−1p(y
r
k|xm,rk ), (2.7)
The weighting coefficient wm,rk|k for m
th particle tracks target aircraft r at time instant at k.
The weighting coefficient for the mth particle which tracks target aircraft r at time instant
k − 1 is denoted as wm,rk|k−1. The weighting coefficient is updated by the likelihood function
p(yrk|xm,rk ), which indicates the likelihood of observation yrk given the current state information
for mth particle.
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2.3.1.2 Estimation
The filter density is approximated by:
pˆ(xr[1,k]|yr[1,k]) =
M∑
m=1
wm,rk|k δ(x
r
[1,k] − xm,r[1,k]), (2.8)
where the mean can be approximated by:
xˆr[1,k] ≈
M∑
m=1
wm,rk|k x
m,r
[1,k]. (2.9)
Here xm,r[1,k] is them
th particle trajectory from first sampling time instant to sampling time instant
k, while xr[1,k] represents target aircraft trajectory from first sampling time instant to sampling
time instant k.
2.3.1.3 Resampling
At each time instant, M samples are chosen from the set {xm,r[1,k]}Mm=1 where the probability of
choosing replacement sample m is:
wm,rk|k =
1
M
. (2.10)
2.3.1.4 Time Update
Particle filter predicts the future state according to the proposed distribution, or the state space
model:
xm,rk+1 ∼ q(xrk+1|xm,rk , yk+1), (2.11)
and compensated by the importance weight:
wm,rk+1|k = w
m,r
k|k
p(xm,rk+1|xm,rk )
q(xm,rk+1|xm,rk , yrk+1)
, (2.12)
where q(xm,rk+1|xm,rk , yrk+1) is a proposed density function. This proposed distribution depends
on the last states in the particle trajectory xm,r[1,k], and also on the next measurement y
r
k+1. The
simplest choice of the proposal is to use the dynamic model introduced in Section 2.1. Particle
Filtering technique is later used in the risk ratio calculations to estimate probability of conflict.
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By using particle filtering technique, the approach can be applied to more general cases than is
possible using Kalman filter based concepts.
2.3.2 Kalman Filtering
A Kalman filter is also an useful tool for target tracking applications which is used in this
thesis. Let n denote the number of elements in the state vector and m denote the number of
observations in the measurement vector. Assume a target tracking filter with n = 4 states and
m = 2 measurements. The filter is used to estimate from noisy measurements of the position
and velocity of a maneuvering target. The tracking filter is based on the laws of motion. A
discrete-time equation of target motion in Cartesian coordinates can be expressed by a state
variable model given by:
x(t+ 1) = Φ(∆t)x(t) + w(t)
y(t) = h(x(t)) + v(t), t = 0, 1, · · · (2.13)
where t is the normalized discrete time, ∆t denotes the sampling, x(t) is a 4-dimensional state
vector with position and velocity in each of the Cartesian coordinates axes x, y. Where Φ is a
(4× 4) matrix given by
Φ =

1 ∆t 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 ∆t
0 0 0 1

(2.14)
The state vector x(t) is represented by
x(t) = [x, x˙, y, y˙]T (2.15)
where T is a transpose operation. The noisy measurements of x and y are denoted by y(t).
y(t) = [x, y]T . (2.16)
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The vector h(x(t)) is the transformation matrix defined by
h(x(t)) =
 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
 (2.17)
It is assumed that the state and measurement noise sequences {w(t)} and {v(t)} are zero mean
gaussian random vector sequences with covariance matrices Q(t) and R(t) respectively.
The measurement errors in x and y (longitude and latitude) are assumed uncorrelated. Let
σ2x, σ
2
y denote the variance of the measurement noise in x and y respectively, the measurement
noise covariance matrix R(t) is given by
R(t) = diag[σ2x, σ
2
y]. (2.18)
The filter consists of time update and measurement update equations summarized in the
following.
2.3.2.1 Time Update
The time-update predicts the state and estimation error covariance matrix using the following
equations:
xˆ(t+ 1|t) = Φxˆ(t|t) (2.19)
P (t+ 1|t) = ΦP (t|t)ΦT +Q(t) (2.20)
where xˆ(t + 1|t) denotes one-step state prediction at time t + 1 based on the measurements
at time t. The state estimate at time t denoted by xˆ(t|t) represents the estimate based on the
measurements at time t. The state transition matrix Φ is defined in Equation (2.31) . The state
estimation error covariance matrix is given by:
P (t|t) = E{xˆ(t|t)xˆT (t|t)}. (2.21)
The state prediction covariance matrix is defined as:
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P (t+ 1|t) = E{xˆ(t+ 1|t)xˆT (t+ 1|t)}. (2.22)
The time update of the covariance matrix P (t + 1|t) accounts for modeling errors and
disturbances by a suitable choice of Q(t).
2.3.2.2 Measurement Update
The measurement update corrects the predicted state and error covariance using the measure-
ment y(t) and the measurement noise covariance matrix R(t) as follows: The prediction error
known as innovations is denoted by e(t) and defined as
e(t) = y(t)− h(xˆ(t|t− 1)) (2.23)
The state estimate is given as
xˆ(t|t) = xˆ(t|t− 1) +K(t)e(t) (2.24)
The covariance of the innovations is denoted by Re(t) and defined by
Re(t) = HP (t|t− 1)HT +R(t) (2.25)
The Kalman gain matrix K(t) and the covariance matrix P (t|t) are given by
K(t) = P (t|t− 1)HTRe(t)−1 (2.26)
P (t|t) = P (t|t− 1)−K(t)HP (t|t− 1) (2.27)
The initial conditions to start the recursive computations are given by xˆ(0|0) = x(0) and
P (0|0) = P (0), the a priori estimates. In practice, only the first few measurements are used
to determine the initial conditions. Kalman Filtering technique is later used in the proposed
automated separation management system. The proposed system utilizes inter-aircraft com-
munication and bank of Kalman filters and is capable of resolving conflicts during periods of
communication failure.
2.4. FILTERING TECHNIQUES IN AIRCRAFT CONFLICT PROBLEMS 19
2.4 Filtering Techniques in Aircraft Conflict Problems
Target tracking using filtering techniques has being well studied in the literature. In this do-
main, filtering techniques has been used in solving aircraft conflict detection and/or resolution
problems.
2.4.1 Kalman Filter Techniques in Conflict Detection Problem
Li et al. [9] proposed a conflict detection algorithm under constant velocity assumption. In their
algorithm, a Kalman filter is used to project the flight trajectories of two aircraft into the future.
According to the predicted flight trajectories, the projected distance between the two aircraft
can be determined.
The probability of conflict is estimated on the basis of Monte Carlo simulations. One of
the disadvantage of using a Kalman filter formulation for conflict detection is that the linear
Gaussian distribution assumption required in the filter restricts usage of these techniques to
specific class of problems with linear Gaussian distribution. For a more general case, the aircraft
states could also includes both aircraft position and velocity as well as the position and velocity
error. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the aircraft states measurements are
often nonlinear. This implies that efficient filtering methods such as the Kalman filter cannot be
used effectively for conflict detection without major modifications.
2.4.2 Particle Filter Techniques in Conflict Detection Problem
For a more general model, Zeng et al. [10] proposed an randomized approach for mid-range
aircraft conflict detection based on the unscented particle filter. In their approach, the particle
filter is used to estimate the instantaneous probability of conflict. The authors modelled radar
measurement error as a combination of along track variance and cross track variance and results
suggest that the probability of successfully detection increases and probability of false alarm
decreases with the decreased measurement error variance. However in their approach, the
measurement error model is limited to along track error and cross track error and realistic radar
models which includes range and bearing accuracy was not been investigated explicitly.
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Lymperopoulos et al. [11] proposed an advanced particle filtering algorithm that can ef-
ficiently cope with high dimensionality and non-linearity in the conflict detection problem.
The performance of conflict detection is improved by reducing aircraft trajectories inaccuracies
relate to wind forecast errors. In their algorithm, the wind forecast error is treated as a stochastic
disturbance to the aircraft dynamics model and the observation model is based on measurements
from ground radar. For simplicity reason, the measurement error is the set to a high variance
of 80m. From simulation, a significant increase in the successful alarms over the agnostic case
were observed. However, there is a high rate of missed conflict detection. The author argued that
the reason for low detection rate was due to a marginal conflict nature where conflict happens
at the boundary of conflict zone. This marginal conflict problem can be resolved by increasing
the margin of conflict radius. However, the method of increasing conflict margin comes with a
cost which is the simultaneous increase in the rate of false alarms. Therefore there is trade-off
between the successfully rate and false alarm rate. The performance of their algorithm can be
further improved if an appropriate margin of conflict radius is selected. This marginal conflict
problem has also being identified by Irvine [12], who proposed a method of estimating conflict
probability. Irvine also proposed two different measurment error models, the first model only
considers along-track errors, the second model includes the cross-track errors as well. Irvine
then estimated the probability of conflict by using a cumulative probability distribution function
(PDF). In both of his models, Irvine stated that the errors in position have a significant impact on
the probability of conflict for marginal conflicts. This marginal conflict problem is a common
problem across all models that have measurement/position uncertainty. Irvine’s model has some
drawbacks, he assumed that the position error are independently Gaussian distributed, however
it may not be true in all situations.
Jansson et al. [13] proposed a probabilistic framework which can be used for analysing
existing conflict detection and resolution algorithms. In this framework, risk for faulty in-
tervention and consequence of different actions can be computed on-line based on statistical
decision making and stochastic numerical integration. Their framework is based on Monte
Carlo techniques; the framework can be used to deal with state estimate uncertainty. To deal
with estimation uncertainty, the probability for each action is calculated. It is then possible to
require a certain predefined confidence for each action. In their framework, particle filters were
used to deal with non-linear and non-Gaussian models. However, the navigation, tracking and
prediction models have not been discussed. This framework is limited when we examine the
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impacts from different navigation models.
2.5 Mathematical Background of Separation Management
This section contains necessary mathematical background information on select separation
management approaches.
2.5.1 Satisficing Approach
As discusses in Chapter 1, in order to understand the impact of uncertainty and risk ratio, it is
important to consider evaluating existing separation management approaches. Satisficing game
theory is a centralized multiagent approach to the resolution of aircraft conflict presented by
Archibald et al. [14]. Collision is avoided by the joint actions of individual aircraft. There
are two properties of aircraft involved in the deconfliction process, the Selectability and Re-
jectability of the particular heading option for that aircraft. At every time stamp, there are
five directional options: ±2.5 degrees, ±5 degrees, 0 degrees. The direction is determined
by utilizing these two properties. The calculation of Selectability is based on how direct the
heading option is to the desired destination as well as the heading options that are conflicting
with each other. The calculation of Rejectability PRi is based on the heading options that conflict
with current headings of other aircraft. Rejectability PRi(ul) for heading (ul) is calculated using
the following equation.
PRi(ul) ∝
∑
Xk∈Pi
WR(Xk(Uc), Xi(Ul)) (2.28)
Where ∝ is the proportionality symbol. The weighting function WR is defined by:
WR(Xk(Uc), Xi(Ul)) =

2α, if dmin(i, k) ≤ Rc
α, if Rc ≤ dmin(i, k) ≤ Rnm
0, otherwise
(2.29)
Where dmin(i, k) is the projected minimum separation distance between ith and kth aircraft.
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Rc is the critical separation distance. Rnm is the near miss distance, and here α is defined as:
α =

(1 + Rnm−dmin(i,j)
Rnm
)( 1
d(i,k)
)β, if d(i, k) ≤ 3Rnm
( 1
d(i,k)
)β, otherwise
(2.30)
The parameter β is a variable that is experimentally tuned. As for the selectability calcula-
tion, a weight ws(ul) is assigned as a function of r(ul) and the magnitude of |udir−ul|. r(ul) is
1 when the heading option is closest to udir and 5 when the heading option furthest from udir.
ws(ul) =

3, r(ul) = 1
2, r(ul) = 2
2, r(ul) = 3, 2.5
◦ < |udir − ul| ≤ 5◦
1.1, r(ul) = 3, 5
◦ < |udir − ul|
1.1, r(ul) = 4, |udir − ul| ≤ 5◦
1, r(ul) = 4, 5
◦ < |udir − ul|
1.1, r(ul) = 5, |udir − ul| ≤ 5◦
1, r(ul) = 5, 5
◦ < |udir − ul|
(2.31)
Here Equation 2.31 shows the weights for ws(ul) under different conditions, the weights
then normalized to form mass function σsi(uil).
Xk ∈ Pi, Xi calculates a matrix of weights for each of its parents:
Wik(u
i
l, u
k
j ) = Ws(Xi(u
i
l), Xk(u
k
j )), k = 0, 1, · · · , |Pi| (2.32)
Where
Ws(Xi(u
i
l), Xk(u
k
j )) =

1, if dmin > Rnm
0, otherwise
(2.33)
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The column of the matrix of weights are then normalized such that
∑
ui∈U
Wik(u
i, ukj ) = 1. (2.34)
Then
ρsi|s1, · · · , s|Pi|(uil|u¯m) ∝
|Pi|∑
k=1
Wik(u
i
l, (u¯
m)k),m = 1, · · · , |U ||Pi| (2.35)
ρsi(u
i
l) =
∑
U1∈U
∑
U2∈U
· · · ∑
UPi∈U
ρsi|s1, · · · , s|Pi|(uil|u1, · · · , u|Pi|)
· pˆs1(u1) · pˆs2(u2) · · · pˆsPi(uPi).
(2.36)
The selectability of that heading option can then be calculated as follows :
psi(u
i
l) = λσsi(u
i
l) + (1− λ)ρsi(uil), λ ∈ [0, 1]. (2.37)
Once the aircraft has determined its selectability and rejectability, it can identify the set of
Satisficing options.
The fundamentally difference between satisficing approach and other conflict resolution
approach is that it is not aiming to find a best solution. Instead, each aircraft determines the
set of acceptable avoidance maneuvers by eliminating from the full set of options as many bad
choices as possible based on safety and efficiency concern. The heading can then be chosen
from remaining alternative according to different needs.
2.5.2 Decentralized Reactive Collision Avoidance Approach (DRCA)
The DRCA method developed by Lalish et al. [15] adopts the collision cone concept to perform
conflict resolution. Conflict in this literature is defined as occurring when two vehicles that they
are not currently in a collision, but with null control inputs (i.e. constant velocity); will at some
future point in time enter a collision. Guaranteeing safety using DRCA is achieved in two steps:
the DRCA method first resolve aircraft conflicts using initial deconfliction maneuvers, which
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consists of hard turn left for aircraft involved in a conflict. And secondly the aircraft maintain
their conflict free trajectories while changing over to their desired heading progressively.
The steps involves in DRCA as follows:
1. Define near side of the collision cone vector c
c = R(sgn(β)α)
r
‖r‖ , (2.38)
Where sgn(x) is the sign function, taking on the value of 1 for x ≥ 0 and −1 for x < 0.
2. Define the normal vector n from the collision cone to the relative velocity vector:
n =

ν, cTν ≤ 0
R(pi
2
)ccTR(pi
2
)Tν, cTν > 0
(2.39)
3. Define the following measures (valid only when not in conflict):
pt =
‖n‖2
sinTgi
and pa =
‖n‖2
nThi
(2.40)
The algorithm running on the ith vehicle simply computes the pt and pa to other vehicles and
then finds the closest conflicts.
4. Find control input using the control function F : ut = F (p+t , p
−
t ). where p
+
t = min{pt >
0, εt}, p−t = −max{pt < 0,−εt}
The control function chosen is defined by the following order triples of the form (p+, p−, u):

P1 = (0, 0, 0)
P2 = (ε, 0, umax)
P3 = (0, ε, umin)
P4 = (ε, ε, ud)
(2.41)
ud must be saturated such that umin ≤ ud ≤ umax.
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The DRCA algorithm is generic and allows each vehicle to have different sizes, speed,
actuation limitations, and gains. It can also be extended to three dimension method fairly easily.
Further details on the DRCA method can be found in [15].
2.6 Summary
The mathematical framework introduced in this chapter provides the foundation for the sepa-
ration management approaches and will be used in the following chapters. This mathematical
framework includes models of aircraft dynamics, aircraft measurement process models, filtering
techniques and mathematical background of separation management approaches.
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Chapter 3
Review of Aircraft Conflict Modelling Tools
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, one of the primary essential abilities of any future air traffic
separation management system is the ability to provide early conflict detection and resolution
effectively and efficiently [16]. Here in this thesis, the risk of conflict is assumed to be a primary
measurement to be used for early conflict detection. This chapter investigates related fields that
could be used to better quantify the risk of conflict.
The specific areas that will be discussed in this chapter are: Section 3.1 defines some
of the terminology and the concept of conflict risk and other related terms used throughout
the subsequent chapters. Section 3.2 discusses different risk of conflict models. Section 3.3
describes methods for estimating the risk of conflict. Section 3.4 details the role of measurement
uncertainty in conflict risk estimations. Section 3.5 provides a summary of the chapter.
3.1 Terminology and Definition
• Critical separation distance: In air traffic control, critical separation distance is the
minimum distance that two aircraft are allowed to approach during normal operation. It
is denoted as Dcr, normally defined by ICAO as 5 nmi [17].
• Risk: is the product of the probability or frequency of occurrence and the magnitude
of consequences or severity of a hazardous event. Generally, risk cannot be determined
directly, because the probability of the event is difficult to quantify.
• Conflict: The term conflict refers to an undesirable interaction event between two aircraft
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where the separation distance is less than the critical separation distance. In this thesis,
this situation is described by a conflict indicator function which is expressed as follows:
C(xrt , x
1
t ) ,

1, if D(xrt , x
1
t ) ≤ Dcr
0, Otherwise,
(3.1)
where xrt ∈ R4 is the target aircraft state, and x1t ∈ R4 is the observer aircraft state. The
distance between the target aircraft and the observer aircraft is denoted as D(xrt , x
1
t ).
• Risk of Conflict: is defined as the product of the probability of conflict and consequences
of conflict event Bc. Let Pr(C(xrt , x
1
t )) denote the probability of the conflict event be-
tween two aircraft at time instant t. The risk of conflict Rt can be expressed as follows:
Rt(x
r
t , x
1
t ) = Bc × Pr(C(xrt , x1t )). (3.2)
• Estimated risk of conflict: is defined as a product of consequences of the conflict event
and the estimated probability of conflict (based on both existing measurement data and
measurement model λ).
Rτ |t(λ) = E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ] = Bc × E[Pr(C(xrτ , x1τ ))|y0,t], (3.3)
where: E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ] is the expected value of Rτ at time instant τ , based on
measurements up to time t using model λ.
τ = t + ` and ` ∈ [0, Tp] represent the prediction length and Tp is the upper limit of the
prediction length.
• Conflict during horizon of interest occurs where there is an undesirable interaction
event between two aircraft where the minimum separation distance achieved during the
interval of interest is less than the critical separation distance. In this thesis, this
situation is described by the interval conflict indicator which is expressed as follows:
Cmt|Tp(x
r, x1) = max
`∈[0,Tp]
C(xrt+`|t, x
1
t+`|t). (3.4)
where xrt+`|t is the predicted target aircraft state at time t + `,and x
1
t+`|t is the predicted
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observer aircraft state at time t+ `.
• Future estimated risk of conflict at time t is defined as the product of the maximum
estimated probability of conflict during the prediction interval and consequences of the
conflict event.
3.2 Models of Conflict Risk
Risk conflict models are used to improve the quantification of the risk of conflict [18]. In
the literature, aircraft conflict risk models are proposed for different purposes. While some
of the early risk models were designed to reduce required aircraft separation distance, thus
increasing the capacity of airspace, recent risk models have emerged to mainly serve the purpose
of detecting conflicts with moderate confidence.
3.2.1 Reich Conflict Risk Model and its Extensions
Early aircraft conflict risk models were mostly developed to assess risk due to a reduction of air
traffic separation distance. The goal of these early models was to increase airspace capacity and
thus cope with growing air transport demands while still maintaining a certain level of safety.
The Reich model was developed by the UK Royal Aircraft Establishment in 1966 and has been
used to estimate the collision risk for flights over the North Atlantic and specify appropriate
separation standards [19]. The Reich model is based on the assumption that there are random
deviations of aircraft positions and speeds from expected flight plans; this model represents
aircraft with 3D boxes. The position errors of these 3D boxes are modelled as random variables
with mean of zero and fixed standard deviations. Even though operationally sound, the Reich
model needs to be extended for it to be used with more realistic uncertainty problems [20].
Since its inception in the mid 60s, many promising variants of the Reich model have been
proposed [20] [21] [22], each with their own strengths and weaknesses. The Machol-Reich
model for instance, was developed from the Reich model [20]. The Machol-Reich model
incorporates realistic aircraft position uncertainties by using historical data about the lateral
position errors for about 14000 flights over the North Atlantic. The Machol-Reich model
enables prediction of collision risk with a moderate level of confidence. Although the Machol-
Reich model has been proven to work well and doubled the capacity of the North Atlantic
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Figure 3.1: Aircraft representation in [2]
airspace [20], this model nevertheless requires a very large set of data to construct an accurate
model in order to accurately estimate risk of conflict. There are often high costs involved in
collecting the necessary amounts of data on three-dimensional aircraft positions to define the
relevant statistical distributions. Additionally, the Machol-Reich model cannot be applied to the
NextGen free flight concept where aircraft have the ability to choose their own flight plans [4].
During the mid 90s, the Generalized Reich model was proposed for the TOPAZ (Traffic
Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer) accident risk assessment methodology [22]. The
Generalized Reich model was based on hybrid-state Markov processes and quantifies risk using
Monte Carlo simulations. The advantage of this model is the improved simulation efficiency.
However, the complex nature of the Generalized Reich model used in TOPAZ means the model
requires a high level of computational effort, and cannot be performed in a online manner if any
of the aircraft in the scenario have changed their trajectories.
In 2010, a risk model based on Reich model was proposed by Yuling et al. [2]. In this risk
model, variable separation distance between two aircraft is expressed as a function of time. This
variable separation distance also takes the speed difference of two aircraft into consideration.
Aircraft in the model is represented using a cylinder instead of the 3D-box representation in
Reich model, where required minimum separation distance is denoted as Smin, see Figure 3.1.
As with Reich’s model [19], Gaussian distribution is selected for describing position error in
sensor measurement and speed uncertainty. In addition, the distribution of position error and
speed uncertainty are assumed to be independent. The key limitation of the risk model proposed
in [2] is the scenario choice and only applies to a two-aircraft collision scenario where they
are flying in a straight line path at the same nominal level on an identical track. Extended
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applications to other more generic scenarios has not been established [2].
3.2.2 Conflict Risk Models Based on Historical Data
The US Department of Transportation extended the statistical probabilistic method of determin-
ing the collision risk from parallel straight-line flight paths to arbitrary flight paths in 1971 [23].
Of particular importance is that simultaneous curvilinear instrument approaches can be used to
study the collision in parallel runways. Through multiple simulations of this extended model,
it is concluded that collision risk increases dramatically with respect to both time between
touchdowns and runway separation distance. The study claimed that if the standard separation
for parallel runway is reduced by half, the collision risk will increase by a factor of 6000 [23].
This model allowed a more realistic calculation of collision risk by allowing more variations in
flight conditions. However, the analysis of the error uncertainties distribution considers only the
statistical combination of initial position and velocity uncertainties, pilot control uncertainties,
and possible changes in flight path due to pilot or controller intervention. As a result, proba-
bility distributions that based on analytical convenience rather than accurate representations are
employed, and therefore the usability of the model is limited when the environment change.
In [24], a prototype airborne collision alerting model for aircraft on approach to closely-
spaced parallel runways based on collision probabilities was proposed by Carpenter et al. In
terms of scope, this model is similar to Bellantoni’s risk model presented in [23]. However,
a different design methodology was used instead of the traditional alerting criteria (Where the
alerting decision is based on the estimated probability of a collision to avoid large time delays
and unacceptable false alert rates). In Carpenter’s risk model [24], an alert will be issued when
the probability of a collision exceeds an acceptable threshold value. A dynamic model is also
developed that includes uncertainties in sensor measurement and in the intentions of the aircraft.
In order to implement this collision alerting system in real time, probability contours were con-
structed through the use of Monte Carlo simulations over a range of aircraft positions, speeds,
headings, and turn rate conditions. These contours were then stored in different look-up tables
that can be accessed in real time for evaluation during numerical simulation of approaches.
However, there are two limitations to this collision model: First, given that GPS and other
navigation system are widely used and implemented, it will be necessary to incorporate data
regarding aircraft tracking performance using different sensors (e.g. heading variability, lateral
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deviation, etc.). Second, the impact of the collision model on the overall system must also be
examined, so that trade-offs between collision models that incorporate different parameters can
be compared.
Work in [25] demonstrated how the risk of collision can be estimated based on existing
historical data. In this risk modelling approach, the collision risk is defined as the product
of probability that a aircraft (on final approach during closely-spaced parallel landings) will
“blunder” in a way that could endanger other aircraft, and the conditional probability that such
a “blunder” will cause a collision. Unfortunately, Federal Aviation Administration was unable
to estimate the conditional probability of a“blunder” that resulted in a collision with another
aircraft because the probability of “blunders” was too small to produce enough data. However,
this work provides an idea of how better estimation of collision risk can be achieved in the long
run with more years of airport observations. One of the disadvantages of risk models based on
historical data is that the scope of the model cannot be easily extended for applications in more
generic situations.
In order to account for more generic conflict risk problems, a model for risk assessment is
proposed by Willemain et al. [26]. Willemain improves barnett’s approach [25] by removing
three of the assumptions: directional restrictions at each altitude, level flight only, and all aircraft
traveling at the same speed. The aircraft trajectories are generalized and numerical estimates
are obtained for several measures of risk. In this risk model, different factors are considered
for the problem: angles of entry and exit of the sector; altitudes at entry and exit of the sector;
time of entry into the sector; and indicated airspeed. Conflict risk here is primarily assessed
using two flight-wise measures: mean distance of closest approach to a given flight by other
aircraft with which that aircraft shares the same sector; mean number of conflicts for a given
flight. Three pairwise measures of risk were also developed, namely the percentage of pairs of
flights sharing the sector, the percentage of pairs that share the sector and approach within five
miles of each other (conflict situation), and the mean closest approach for pairs that share the
sector. The resulting simulations provide quantitative relationships between the risk measures
and demonstrates that risk of conflict under free flight is heavily dependent on the levels and
combinations of several risk measures. It is suggested that time-average density would be a
powerful measure of risk. However, Willemain’s method relies on the fact that there is no
uncertainty related to the generated trajectories. In real world exercises, uncertainty needs
to be taken into account as one of the important factors that influences the risk of conflict.
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Figure 3.2: Figure shows the circular sector flight trajectory in Willemain’s simulation
Improvement can also be made in terms of modelling fidelity.
Fulton categorized mid-air collision via concepts of collective risk and an individual risk
[27]. Here collective risk is defined as fatalities per annum and individual risk is defined as the
fraction of a population to die due to a specified accidental cause per annum. Fulton concluded
that by associating each population group with an individual risk level, an assessment as to the
acceptability of that risk can be formed. Fulton also stated that a predictive model and historic
measurement are useful in developing these approaches to setting national policy and for long-
term monitoring of accident and fatality rates. However, the predictive model has the limitation
that in order to achieve appropriate risk level, one must manage an aircraft’s exposure to a
proximity event and minimize the probability that a collision will occur given that the proximity
event occurs.
Brooker [28] discussed the quantification of the risk of mid-air collisions to commercial air
transport aircraft receiving a Radar Advisory Service (RAS) in UK Class F/G airspace. RAS
refers to the information about advice on action necessary to resolve potential conflicts and
erosions of separation. They are provided by air traffic controllers (ATCs), based on a radar
picture, of the bearing, distance and the flight level of other aircraft in the vicinity. The risk of
mid-air collision in this context is defined as the proportion of fatal accidents per certain fixed
flying hours and this risk is then estimated by means of causal chain analysis (CCA) sometimes
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referred to as Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) [28]. In causal chain analysis, in order to
estimate the risk of mid-air collision, probabilities of the combinations of circumstances are
multiplied together to calculate an overall risk. Through the use of CCA, Brooker provided a
statistical method to quantify mid-air collision risk; however, the accuracy of this risk quantifi-
cation method relies heavily on the statistical data available to use, and future risk on mid-air
collision has not been addressed explicitly.
3.2.3 The MEBRA and Lindsten’s Conflict Risk Model
Abbass et al. [29] proposed a risk assessment model called multi objective evolutionary-based
risk assessment (MEBRA). Figure 3.3 shows the solution process in MEBRA model. Instead
of estimating risk of conflict, the MEBRA model aims to assess risk due to conflict detection
system failure in certain scenarios. MEBRA model performs searches on the problem space
rather than on the solution space. By going through scenario representation, scenario genera-
tion, scenario evaluation and scenario mining, the MEBRA model offers a way of modelling
and identifying the risk presented in complex systems. It is a quantitative framework which
makes use of search capabilities of evolutionary computations. This risk model can be used to
identify risky scenarios that ‘break’ the air traffic conflict detection system. Therefore MEBRA
model is a good assessment tool for testing any air traffic conflict detection system. However,
the main focus of this risk model is to represent air traffic scenarios. The MEBRA model lacks
the ability to determine both current conflict risk and how future conflict risk evolves over time
due to uncertainty in measurements.
Another conflict risk model was developed by Lindsten [30], this model is different from
the majority of risk modelling methods found in literature (which commonly deal with in-
stantaneous risk of conflict, i.e the risk of conflict at a certain time instant). One problem
with instantaneous risk of conflict is how to interpret the result with respect to a predicted,
not necessarily straight, trajectory. Note that simply integrating instantaneous probability over
time does not yield an accurate risk estimate a function of the time interval (because the events
representing instantaneous risk are dependent on consecutive time points). Rather than focusing
on instantaneous risk, Lindsten’s model estimates the risk of conflict using cumulated risk over
time [30]. He claimed that accumulated risk can be used to overcome the disadvantage of
instantaneous risk in situations where misleading information was presented choosing peaks or
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Figure 3.3: Figure shows the solution process in MEBRA model
means of the distribution. The accumulated risk assessment is based on the extended Kalman
filter with angle-only measurements. Lindsten also evaluated the sensitivity of instantaneous
risk and cumulated risk for different realistic conflict situations. Based on the results obtained
using Monte Carlo methods, he concluded that the cumulated risk is more robust against state
uncertainty instantaneous risk. As with other models, Lindsten’s model has some drawbacks
(for example, to accurately represent the conflict situation using cumulated risk, an appropriate
critical time horizon must be chosen first). In addition, the lack of discussion on the critical time
horizon narrows the scope of Lindsten’s model [30]. Finally, in Lindsten’s model, uncertainty
is based on Gaussian normal distributions and different sources of uncertainty from non-linear
measurement devices have not been separately addressed.
The following section will present the literature in the area of conflict risk estimation and
related issues when there is measurement uncertainty.
3.3 Methods for Estimating the Risk of Conflict
Aircraft conflict probabilities, together with conflict cost, are the key components of conflict
risk analysis [31]. Most researchers in the area of air traffic management have looked into
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ways of determining or estimating conflict probabilities as part of the conflict detection and/or
resolution problem [22, 24, 32–34]
One early aircraft collision probabilities estimation method was proposed by Hsu [35].
Hsu evaluated the aircraft collision probabilities at intersecting air routes over offshore and
continental areas. Intersecting air routes imply that those routes arbitrarily cross one another
at a particular point rather other than at a waypoint along a given route. In Hsu’s modelling
technique, a mixture of two double-double exponential (DDE) distributions were used to de-
termine collision probabilities at intersection points along air routes. For reasons of simplicity,
the aircraft collision problem was partitioned into two sub problems: One in the horizontal
plane and one in the vertical plane. The horizontal plane sub problem is applicable to aircraft
flying at the same altitude on level flight routes and the flight routes are valid if the respective
components of position error are independent of each other. The independent binomial variables
were approximated by Poisson random variables. Hsu was able to determine the targeted
collision probabilities using approximated Poisson distributions. However, in real life scenarios,
the assumption on independent position error is not valid when disturbances such as wind
perturbations are present.
Several models have been proposed to account for uncertainty associated with conflict prob-
ability (such as wind perturbations). Prandini et al. [36] proposed a conflict probability model
for two mid-range aircraft encounter problem that takes wind contribution into consideration.
The mid-range model is meant to provide centralized conflict information to the ATC. In this
model, the resultant deviation from the nominal trajectory is modelled as the sum of different
independent random perturbations acting together. The tracking errors in Prandini’s model
are described by using four parameters: zero-mean Gaussian random variable; variance of the
along-track error which grows quadratically with time; variance of the horizontal cross-track
error which grows quadratically with the travelled distance until the error reaches a fixed value
and, finally, the variance of the vertical cross-track error which remains constant. By using the
stochastic ODE model presented in [36], the criticality measure which is the maximum value
of the probability of conflict over a finite horizon of length (i.e. the time horizon =20 min)
can be determined. Prandini et al. [36] also proposed a model for computing the probability of
conflict for short-range two aircraft encounters. Different from the mid-range model, the short-
range model on the other hand provides decentralized advisories to the pilot. The proposed
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short-range model is based on an approximation of the mid-term prediction model; the short-
range model represents the motion of aircraft as a deterministic motion plus a Brownian motion
perturbation. In contrast to the variance of along-track and cross-track error in mid-range
models, the variance of error in short-range models grow linearly with time. By doing so,
the model allows for very fast computations while still approximating the conflict probabilities.
One major limitation of both models is that they ignore errors in the radar and other sensor
measurements which are a normal part of the uncertainty in aircraft trajectories.
Another way to account for uncertainty is by utilizing Markov chain approximations. Hu
et al. [37] improved the model from their previous work in [38] and [39] where independence
perturbation assumptions were used. They addressed wind perturbation in their conflict prob-
ability model [37], where the aircraft future position is predicted based on a stochastic model
that incorporates the information on the aircraft plan, and takes into account the presence of
wind as the main source of uncertainty on the aircraft motion. The wind is modelled as a
three dimensional field with spatially correlated random perturbations. Based on the predicted
position of aircraft, the probability of conflict can then be estimated using an iterative algorithm
which is based on the Markov chain approximation method. In Hu’s conflict probability model,
the state space is formed by gridding the region of airspace with a fixed grid size. The Markov
chain, with a proper choice of transition probabilities, guarantees to converge weakly to the
solution of the approximated stochastic system as the grid size approaches zero. However with a
decrease in grid size, the Markov chain approximation will potentially become computationally
expensive and not feasible for real time processes.
Based on [36] and [37], Al-Basman combined a Multi-level (ML) method with Markov
chain approximation to improve the conflict probability estimation performance of his algo-
rithm [3]. ML methods have been widely and successfully used to solve partial differen-
tial equations, the approximation method proposed by Al-Basman consisted of a Fine-Level
Markov Chain (FLMC) and a Coarse-Level Markov Chain (CLMC). The FLMC is used in a
smaller subset ‘S’ of the open domain ‘U’ where accurate estimates of probability of conflict are
performed. CLMC is used in the open domain ‘U’. Figure 3.4 shows the relationship between
FLMC and CLMC. The use of the two-level method increases the speed of the algorithm since
the common grid points of the CLMC and the FLMC are updated more frequently. Therefore,
this two-level Markov chains approximation method achieved a better solution speed compared
with the traditional one-level Markov chain method. On the other hand, Al-Basman uses a
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Figure 3.4: Figure shows the relationship between FLMC and CLMC in Al-Basman combined
Multi-level (ML) method [3]
linear dynamics representation of aircraft and a Guassian uncertainty model. Thus, complex
factors such as sensor choice and sensor errors cannot be modelled.
3.4 Measurement Uncertainty in Conflict Risk Estimations
In the area of conflict risk estimation, many researchers have claimed that measurement uncer-
tainty from different sensors impacts on the estimated risk of conflict [40, 41].
3.4.1 Measurement Uncertainty using Gaussian Distribution Representation
Prandini et al. [40] proposed a conflict risk estimation model that can be used in conflict
detection systems to provide ATC with assistance. In this model, radar measurements are repre-
sented using simple additive white noise and aircraft movement is represented using stochastic
differential equations. The position estimates from radar measurement are available every few
seconds (typically 12 seconds) where the measurement noise is described as a sequence of
independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and a
fixed noise covariance. The Prandini’s model makes extensive use of randomized algorithms for
estimating integrals and carrying out optimisations. The advantage of using these implemented
randomized techniques is that they tend to be computationally more efficient and provide ana-
lytical bounds on the accuracy of the approximation involved.
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However, there are two assumptions required in the Prandini’s model. Firstly, the flight plan
of each aircraft is known and the flight plan is described in terms of a sequence of way points.
Secondly, Prandini et al. assumes that measurement noise is independent of all the other random
variables involved in the conflict probability model. However, the tracking noise is partially due
to the wind perturbations, which may be strongly correlated between the two aircraft, especially
near the conflict point where the aircraft are close to each other. In addition, the limitation of
using Gaussian variables restricts the usage of this conflict probability model cases where there
are limited sensor observation choices.
Temizer et al. [6] recognized the importance of measurement uncertainty in the process
of conflict risk estimation. In Temizer’s model, Temizer applied Markov Decision Process
(MDP) and Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) solution methods to the
problem of collision avoidance where the sensor has positional uncertainty or limited field-of-
view constraints. Temizer estimated the risk of conflict based on different sensor choices (TCAS
Sensor, Radar Sensor, EO/IR Sensor). In this work, risk ratio was used as a metric to determine
the performance of different sensors (Here,the risk ratio associated with a particular sensor
is defined as the probability that an encounter will lead to a near mid-air-collision (NMAC)
using the sensors divided by the probability that an encounter leads to an NMAC without the
sensor). Note that, better performance is indicated by a smaller risk ratio. Temizer’s model
model performed well under two assumptions, (1) The sensor measurements are modelled based
on Gaussian distribution. This Gaussian distribution assumption restricts the model’s use to only
few selected sensors. (2) It is assumed that the sensor error standard deviation is fixed. As a
result, the model cannot be easily extended for applications in more generic situations where
sensors have different levels of accuracy.
Chen et al. [42] proposed an probabilistic algorithm for multi-aircraft conflict detection .
Within Chen’s probabilistic algorithm, uncertainties in the aircraft position are represented us-
ing Gaussian distribution with zero-mean and fixed value variance. The probabilities of conflict
are estimated by using integrals over the conflict zone and the maximum value of probabilities
is chosen as a metric for detection of conflict. Chen’s algorithm is suitable for piecewise flight
plans. However, as pointed out by Chen et al., the accuracy of the algorithm relies heavily on the
accuracy of the measurement models. Therefore, it is important to investigate how measurement
accuracy impacts on the probability of conflict.
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Figure 3.5: Encounter geometry in the horizontal plane: prediction error ellipse grows with
respect to predicted time
Paielli et al. [33] proposed a conflict probability estimation method given a pair of predicted
trajectories and their levels of uncertainty as illustrated in Figure 3.5. In Paielli’s work, the
trajectory prediction errors are modelled as normally distributed, and the two error covariances
for an aircraft pair are combined into a single, equivalent covariance of the relative position. A
coordinate transformation is then used to derive an analytical solution of predicted trajectories
uncertainties. Later in 1999, Paielli et al. introduced a different method called conflict prob-
ability estimation (CPE) which can be applied in non-level flight [43]. In this later work, the
uncertainty in aircraft trajectory prediction is modelled as an extension of the earlier uncertainty
model. Now, the combined error ellipsoid is calculated and assigned to one of the aircraft,
referred to as the stochastic aircraft, while the other aircraft is regarded as having no positional
uncertainty. Then the total conflict probability is equal to the portion of probability mass within
the extended conflict zone, where the extended conflict zone is defined as the volume swept by
the conflict zone (a vertical cylinder) during an aircraft encounter event. Paielli et al. introduced
a number of the modelling assumptions that are not valid in general and fail to properly model
prediction errors. Hence, unfortunately, Paielli’s estimation method needs to be modified and
further developed in order to account for a different prediction error model.
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3.4.2 Other Measurement Uncertainty Representations
Yang et al. [44] proposed a prototype alerting system in 1997 which was based on probabilis-
tic analysis through modelling of aircraft sensor and trajectory uncertainties. Yang’s model
assumed that data-link between aircraft is available and that information can be exchanged to
resolve any potential conflict. The probability of conflict was estimated using Monte Carlo
simulations. In this model, a System Operating Characteristic (SOC) curve is presented by
plotting the probability of success alert against the probability of unnecessary alert (Figure
4.3 shows an example of a SOC curve). The most effective avoidance options can then be
determined from the shape of their SOC curves. In regards to uncertainty, Yang et al. specified
the uncertainty model parameter according to different distributions, e.g. Lateral position
error was modelled as Gaussian distribution with standard deviation of 50 meters. These
uncertainty model parameter have been pre-set and then used to determine the probability
of conflict through Monte Carlo simulations. A major limitation of Yang’s model is that a
significant amount of pre-processing power was required. In addition, Yang’s model applies
only to the specific probabilistic parameter used in the Monte Carlo runs. If a change in
Yang’s model is required (e.g., to examine the effect of varying sensor accuracy or different
sensor combinations), then the Monte Carlo simulations must be rerun using different parameter
settings in the model. A real-time model that incorporates the probability of conflict would be
valuable in terms of improving the model’s flexibility.
Chryssanthacopoulos et al. [45] also addressed the importance of accommodating state
uncertainty within probability models. The authors presented a computationally efficient prob-
ability model for accounting for state uncertainty based on dynamic programming. The prob-
lem of collision avoidance using TCAS sensor was first introduced as a POMDP and solved
approximately. In Chryssanthacopoulos’s work, the belief state was computed using Kalman
filters, and the state-action utilities were then computed by solving the underlying MDP using
dynamic programming. Then the probability of conflict can be estimated by Monte Carlo
simulations. Through the use of Monte Carlo simulations for realistic encounter scenarios,
Chryssanthacopoulos et al. demonstrated that properly handling state uncertainty rather than
simply using point estimates which can cut the estimated probability of conflict by half without
increasing the alert rate. This reduction in the probability of conflict significantly improves
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Figure 3.6: An example of a System Operating Characteristic (SOC) curve
the robustness and reduces sensor error effects on the collision avoidance model. Chryssan-
thacopoulos also showed that using point estimates leads to severely degraded performance
when sensor noise is increased, compared to the graceful degradation that occurs when full
distributions are used. Therefore, Chryssanthacopoulos’s risk model becomes more important
in situations where noisy sensors such as passive radar or electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) were
used. However, Chryssanthacopoulos et al.’s model introduced a number of assumptions:
firstly, the model considered only the Gaussian posterior distribution on sensor position and
velocity errors. Secondly, range error was modelled as a zero-mean Gaussian with 50 ft standard
deviation. Lastly, the bearing error was modelled as a zero-mean Gaussian with 10 degree stan-
dard deviation. This fixed-accuracy assumption limits the application of Chryssanthacopoulos’s
model. More importantly, other distributions should also be considered in order to include more
sensor choices in this model.
3.4.3 Sensor Accuracy and Sensor Choices in Measurement Uncertainty
Measurement uncertainty models should reflect both sensor accuracy and sensor choices. Sen-
sor accuracy is an important factor that contributes to aircraft position uncertainty, but not all
prediction models address measurement uncertainty. Models that do account for measurement
uncertainty are generally in the form of Gaussian distribution errors and are presented in terms
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of along-track error and cross-track errors. Although this uncertainty presentation helps to ana-
lytically estimate the probability of conflict, this uncertainty model cannot be used to investigate
the impact of varying different components of sensor accuracy (e.g. radar range, radar bearing,
radar elevation).
There is some literature that tries to address the sensor accuracy problem. For example,
Chen et al. [42] identified the issue of sensor accuracy in their multi-aircraft conflict detection
algorithm. Yang et al. [44] and Carpenter et al. [24] attempted to address sensor accuracy
in relation to the probability of conflict; However, the Gaussian distribution model limited
the scope of the model. Chryssanthacopoulos [45] also demonstrated that properly handling
state uncertainty can reduce the estimated probability of conflict and improve the robustness of
conflict models to sensor errors. Although sensor accuracy plays an important role in position
uncertainty, the sensor accuracy requirement has never been motivated from a risk of conflict
perspective. By understanding the sensor accuracy requirement, industry manufacturers can use
the sensor requirement as a reference to choose sensors with appropriate levels of accuracy. This
in turn can save expenditure on excessively accurate but expensive sensors for aircraft avionics
systems.
Sensor choices can also impact on estimated risk of conflict. For example, in a paper by
Temizer et al. [46], Partially Observable Markov Decision Process models (POMDP) was used
in determining the differences in risk between radar sensor, TCAS sensor and EO/IR sensor.The
authors estimated the risk of conflicts based on different sensor options. However, conflict risk
benefits brought about by combining different sensor systems have not been examined in the
literature. Such examples include a combination of existing radar with growing implemented
ADS-B. Currently, ADS-B has 3 protocols: 1090Mhz extended squitter (selected as the initial
link for European airspace), VDL Mode 4 (Very High Speed Data link), and UAT (Universal
Access Time). Globally the ADS-B data link is 1090 ES, UAT and VDL-4 will be used on
regional basis. UAT met more of the performance-related link evaluation criteria addressed by
the TLAT than either of the other two candidates in the future high-density Los Angeles Basin
2020 scenario. Therefore, different use of ADS-B protocols would affect the performance of
different risk models [47].
Tools such as risk ratio can then be used as an excellent candidature metric to evaluate the
conflict risk benefits brought about by using different sensor combinations [46].
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Most existing measurement models use Gaussian distribution in either their sensor error
model or aircraft position uncertainty model. However, Campos [48] [49] claimed that his
exponential parametric model is more appropriate than Gaussian distribution models. Therefore
non-linear filters such as particle filters are needed, so that more complicated situations can be
modelled.
3.5 Summary
A number of conflict risk models and risk estimation methods were presented in this chapter.
The detailed estimation methods form the basis of evaluating risk of conflict later in Chapter
5. Furthermore, some literature has been identified that discusses the relations between mea-
surement uncertainty and estimated risk of conflict. Chapter 4 will present a comprehensive
literature review related to separation management system approaches. The approaches include
both centralized and decentralized approaches.
Chapter 4
Review of Separation Management Approaches
This chapter presents an overview of separation management approaches used for air traffic
management. Some of the concepts form the basis of the augmented separation management
systems proposed in later chapters. Throughout this chapter, the following definitions will be
used:
• Automated Aircraft Separation Management: An automated decision making approach
for controlling the movement of aircrafts through a defined airspace to ensure suitable
separation is maintained.
• Collision Avoidance Manoeuvre: Proactively manoeuvre to prevent collision with another
aircraft.
• Centralized Separation Management: A separation management approach where one
central decision location makes decisions for all aircraft.
• Decentralized Separation Management: A separation management approach where indi-
vidual aircraft make their own individual decision about how to achieve separation based
on their on-board information.
Here the term “conflict” refers to an undesirable interaction event between two aircraft
where the separation distance is less than the critical separation distance. (normally defined by
ICAO as 5 nmi) [31]. There are many ways to categorize separation management approaches.
In a journal paper by Kuchar and Yang [31], the authors describe a framework in which 68
previously published methods for separation management system are categorized. Critical
factors in their taxonomy included:
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• Method of dynamic state propagation and its related conflict detection threshold (nominal,
worst-case, or probabilistic)
• Resolution methods (prescribed, optimized, force-field, or manual)
• Maneuvering options (speed change, lateral, vertical, or combined)
• Ability to manage multiple aircraft
Most of the current separation management system literature has assumed that a separation
management system can be designed using one of two approaches: decentralized or centralized
approaches [50].
4.1 Decentralized Separation Management Approaches
This section briefly describe a number of the key decentralized separation management ap-
proaches, namely: non-cooperative game theory, myopic decentralized approach, look-ahead
decentralized approach, Auto Air Collision Avoidance System, model predictive control method,
Kripke approach, and Decentralized Reactive Collision Avoidance for multivehicle system
(DRCA).
4.1.1 Non-cooperative Game Theory
A game theory approach attempts to mathematically capture behavior in situations in which
an individual’s success in making choices depends on the choices of others. While initially
developed to analyse competitions in which one individual does better at another’s expense,
the game theory approach has been expanded to different areas such as resolution strategy
for non-cooperative conflicts between non-UAV aircraft. In a paper presented by Tomlin et
al. [5] in 1997, a technique for UAV conflict resolution using game theory was proposed.
Tomlin suggested that the safest possible strategy for each aircraft was to fly a trajectory which
guaranteed the minimum allowable separation while considering the worst action that could
be taken by the other aircraft. Later in 1998, Tomlin et al. [51] improved their algorithm by
incorporating calculations of corresponding safe set of control inputs, providing a methodology
for their Multiagent Hybrid System. One feature in their algorithm is partitioning the alert zone
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into safe and unsafe regions based on the aircraft’s maneuver capability. This is an important
feature as the partition maximizes the number of options available for potential manoeuvres
while not sacrificing the safety requirement. However, due to the the assumption of known
exact states of every other aircraft, this algorithm cannot be fully utilised when dealing with
uncertainties.
4.1.2 Myopic Decentralized approach
There are two decentralized air traffic separation approaches presented by Krozel et al. [50].
The myopic decentralized approach is one of them; the approach is a user-oriented strategy
which emphasizes the efficiency of individual aircraft. A conflict is “detected” if a conflict
is predicted to occur with a time to closet approach value of less than 8 minutes. If an aircraft
detects conflicts with more than one aircraft within the 8-minute window, the myopic separation
approach resolves them in a sequential pair-wise fashion. Only the most immediate conflict will
be resolved. The myopic decentralized strategy determines the most efficient resolution, and
executes the maneuver that requires the least amount of heading change. The myopic decentral-
ized strategy is a classic decentralized approach; however, it lacks the conflict resolution ability
in scenarios like formation flight.
4.1.3 Look-ahead Decentralized Approach
Similar to the myopic decentralized approach, the look-ahead decentralized strategy is the
second approach presented by Krozel [50]. It first determines the more efficient maneuver
(front side/back side), then it checks if this maneuver would create a new conflict with time
to closest approach value less than that of original conflict. If no such conflict is found, it
executes the more efficient maneuver which yields the same solution as the myopic approach.
However if a new conflict is detected, it checks the other (back side/front side) solution to see
if a conflict-free path is available. If so, it executes that solution. If not, this strategy searches
for conflict-free paths, starting from the more efficient solution with heading change increments
of 5 degrees, until a conflict-free path is found. Figure 4.1 shows the main difference between
the myopic decentralized approach and the look-ahead decentralized approach in a situation
where a domino effect will happen. The look-ahead decentralized method has addressed the
main disadvantage of the decentralized approach. The look-ahead decentralized method has the
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Figure 4.1: Figure shows the comparison of two decentralized approaches.
flexibility to trade off some efficiency in return for some overall stability, enabling it to mitigate
the domino effect which is a potential limitation of the decentralized approach. However, the
look-ahead decentralized method still lacks the ability to resolve conflicts that involve multiple
domino effects (where the resolution of one conflicting manoeuvre can cause conflict with
another aircraft).
4.1.4 Auto Air Collision Avoidance System
The increasing rate of mid-air collision incidents has lead to the development of Automatic Air
Collision Avoidance System (Auto ACAS). The algorithm for this system was first proposed
by Ikeda et al. in 2001 [52]. It uses optimal coordinated escape maneuvers to avoid mid-
air collision. There are two advantages when compared with other separation management
approaches. First of all, when it is activated, the system will take control of the aircraft at the
last possible moment to avoid a collision then return control to the pilot as soon as the aircraft
begins separating. By doing this, it will reduce the interference with the pilot’s ability to perform
the mission. Secondly, the algorithm is designed to operate safely despite failures such as GPS
or data link dropout. The system has demonstrated successful performance in both simulations
and flight tests with F16 aircraft in 2003 [53].
The Auto ACAS uses a different approach from the existing separation management tech-
niques, and is intended to complement other systems rather than replace them. It was designed
such that it will perform separation maneuvers at the last second if other separation systems fail
to do so. The algorithm used by Auto ACAS is relatively simple. Each aircraft equipped with
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Auto ACAS calculates three possible manoeuvre to escape the potential collision, then shares
the information with other nearby aircraft, and then the Auto ACAS select the best manoeuvre
which maximizes the minimum separation distance.
While the simulation presented by Ikeda et al. [52] shows promising results, the impact of
low communication rates was not been addressed in the paper. Furthermore, there is still a
need for future development of the algorithm in order to provide protection for aircraft/UAV
not equipped with Auto ACAS.
4.1.5 Model Predictive Control Method
Model Predictive Control (MPC), also known as receding horizon control, is an advanced
method of process control that has been used in the process industries since the 1980s. MPC
relies on a dynamic model of the process under control, most often these models are linear
empirical models obtained by system identification. These models are sometimes used to
predict the behavior of dependent variables (i.e. outputs) of a non-UAV system with respect
to changes in the process independent variables (i.e. inputs). Recently, this methodology was
used to deal with UAV formulation tracking and separation issues.
In some of the early work published in the field of MPC, Dunbar et al. [54, 55] demon-
strated that the desired UAV formation is not necessarily a unique state for each vehicle in the
formation. Simulation results presented by Dunbar et al. [54] demonstrated the ability of the
MPC algorithm to guarantee stabilization and constrain performance in preventing collisions. A
similar approach was also developed by Tamas Keviczky et al. [56]. The authors implemented
a decentralized receding horizon control for high level control and coordination of UAV teams
and their research was focused on minimization of error between UAV relative distances. By
doing this, the formation can allow collision avoidance requirements to be easily included
as additional constraints between each pair of UAVs. The major advantage of this approach
compared to later discussed centralized approaches is that the computational effort remain
feasible when facing an increasing number of UAVs in formation. Their simulation presented
in research paper [56] demonstrated impressive performance in different scenarios. However
a number of limitations and assumptions are identified, such as omitting wind gusts and UAV
flying dynamics. Such omissions will result in potential errors in realistic environments where
UAVs are very sensitive to wind gusts and its dynamics.
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In a recent publications on this topic (2008), Lavaei et al. [57] presented a MPC technique
for decentralized control of aircraft with reduced communication requirements. Lavaei’s tech-
nique can minimise the information exchange, thus establish communication links using lower
rate. Lavaei’s technique can potentially be used to help solving communication issues such as
low communication rates and communication failure. On the other hand, this technique can also
potentially have a negative impact on the output performance in the presence of uncertainties.
Therefore, trade-offs between communication cost and robust performance will need to be
further investigated.
4.1.6 Kripke Approach
The Kripke approach is a formal semantics for non-classical logic systems created in the late
1950s and early 1960s by Saul Kripke. Kripke models have been adopted as the standard type
of models for modal and related non-classical logics. Tsourdos et al. [58] uses Kripke models
with temporal logic statements and their automatic verification of the model to handle different
kinds of uncertainty and dynamics in co-operating multiple UAVs. The main advantage of
this decentralized approach is its ability to represent real world uncertainty using a formal, yet
intuitive model in the form of a directed graph. Although these models are relatively simple,
they are sufficiently expressive to capture those aspects of dynamic and discrete event behaviors
that are most important for reasoning about reactive systems. However, the performance of such
algorithms has not been addressed explicitly.
4.1.7 Decentralized Reactive Collision Avoidance for Multivehicle system
The DRCA method developed by Lalish and Morgansen adopts the collision cone concept to
perform conflict resolution [15]. The guarantee of safety is achieved in two steps: Firstly, the
DRCA method resolves aircraft conflicts using initial deconfliction maneuvers, which consist
of “hard turn left” for aircraft involved in a conflict. Secondly, the aircraft change over to their
desired directions progressively after conflict is resolved. The DRCA algorithm allows each
vehicle to have different size, speed, actuation limitations, and gains. It can also be extended to
a three dimension method fairly easily [15]. However, the major disadvantage of this method is
the inability to guarantee a successful conflict resolution from the initial deconfliction maneu-
vers in the DRCA algorithm. Furthermore, due to the nature of the algorithm, the DRCA method
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does not deal with non-cooperative aircraft which also reduces the usability of the algorithm.
4.1.8 Other Techniques
Other techniques for decentralized separation management have also been identified: self or-
ganizational approach [59]; modified potential algorithm [60]; the geometric optimization ap-
proach [61] and KB3D algorithm and its extension [62].
4.2 Centralized Separation Management Approaches
One major disadvantage of decentralized separation management techniques is that they suffer
from the “domino effect” where the resolution of one conflicting manoeuvre can cause conflict
with another aircraft. This can be overcome, however, by using a centralized separation man-
agement approach. The following sections introduce seven centralized separation management
approaches: Brute-force algorithm, genetic algorithm, primal-dual quadratic programming,
semidefinite programming, mixed integer programming, grid-based approach, satisficing ap-
proach and delay based ranking separation algorithm.
4.2.1 Brute-Force Algorithm
In computer science, brute-force or exhaustive search approaches provide general problem-
solving techniques, which involve systematically enumerating all possible candidates for the
solution and checking whether each candidate satisfies the problem’s statement. Dejong, in his
master thesis [63], discussed the usage of brute force in separation management. This method is
guaranteed optimal for considering the smallest possible situation. This approach may be quite
satisfactory for a small number of aircraft, but may exceed the bounded time requirements for
a large number, therefore brute-force algorithms are rarely used in separation management due
to their inability to handle large numbers of candidates.
4.2.2 Genetic Algorithm
A genetic algorithm (GA) is a search technique used in computing to find exact global or
approximate solutions to optimization and search problems. Genetic algorithms are a particular
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class of evolutionary algorithms that use techniques inspired by evolutionary biology. The GA
optimization process involves four steps: generating the population of problem solutions as gene
strings (initially random); evaluating these solutions; selecting the solutions that should survive
to the next generation; and combining the survivors into new solutions. GA algorithms have
previously been used to solve en-route aircraft conflict automatically. For example, Durand et
al. [64] (1996) proposed a separation management approach based on the genetic algorithm that
took aircraft speed uncertainties into account. Because of uncertainties, the aircraft manoeuvres
must be started as late as possible with respect to the aircraft constraints to avoid generating new
conflicts with any other aircraft. The major disadvantage is that genetic algorithms are slow and
computationally expensive. The manoeuvres considered in algorithm presented by Durand et
al. are limited to only the 2D plane.
4.2.3 Semidefinite Programming
Semidefinite programming (SDP) is a subfield of convex optimization concerned with the opti-
mization of a linear objective function over the intersection of the cone of positive semidefinite
matrices with an affine space. Many practical problems in operations research and combinato-
rial optimization can be modelled or approximated as semidefinite programming problems.
An example of using semidefinite programming in designing separation management is
presented by Frazzoli et al. [65] published in 1999, where the authors formulate the conflict
resolution problem as a non-convex, quadratically constrained quadratic program. It was de-
veloped on the basis of previously discussed primal dual quadratic programming. Like all
other optimization problems, constraints need to be defined first; in this case, constraints of the
following three types have been considered: collision avoidance constraints (based on exact
location of the aircraft pair); manoeuvring constraints (based on max/min speed); cost function
(chosen to minimize the speed deviations from the desired speed).
The optimization then is solved via semidefinite programming combined with a random-
ization scheme. The research paper which shows simulations involves two crossing aircraft
strings suggest that the algorithm has a very good ability in handling multiple aircraft [65]. The
advantage of using such an semidefinite programming approach is that it will always generate
straight, conflict-free trajectories over a time horizon longer than necessary and generate seg-
mented trajectories only through updates from individual preferences while other approaches
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generate trajectories with little or no guarantees about what happens if the waypoints are missed.
However, further investigation of this method is needed to evaluate if it can account for com-
munication issues such as low communication rates and communication failure.
4.2.4 Mixed Integer Programming
In mathematics, linear programming problems determine ways of achieving the best outcomes
given some requirements represented as linear equations. If only some of the unknown variables
are required to be integers, while others are real numbers, then the problem becomes a mixed
integer programming (MIP) problem which is a special case of linear programming.
Pallottino et al. [66] designed a system in which the way-points were given to avoid all
possible conflicts while minimizing the total flight time. The system consists of two main
parts: firstly, building conflict avoidance constraints for both velocity change and heading angle
deviation and secondly formulating the constraint as mixed-integer linear constraints suitable
for a standard optimization software such as CPLEX [67]. Simulation testing results presented
by Pallottino et al. [66] showed that their system can handle situations where 15 aircraft cross
the origin at the same time. It was highlighted that few assumptions such as fixed altitude and
known exact position and velocity were made in the research paper to idealize the environment.
In Christodoulou et al.’s paper [68], a more complex model was created to manage the conflict
resolution. A combination of the velocity and heading angle control were used to resolve the
conflict with the use of the optimization software GAMS [69]. However, measurement issues
were not addressed.
4.2.5 Grid-Based Approach
The Conflict Grid method is a separation management designing technique based on the use
of a 4-dimensional space grid (three spatial dimensions and time) to represent airspace for
computationally efficient strategic air traffic conflict detection method. The idea was to store
aircraft trajectories in 4-D grid space and set the value of the grid cell to 1. The benefit of such
an approach is that the region of bad weather and special-use airspace can easily be incorporated
into the conflict grid by denoting the grid as inaccessible. In the research paper [70], Jardin et
al extended the grid method to the stochastic conflict grid method, which stores the probability
that at least one active constraint exists in any given grid cell rather than using 1 or 0. The
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advantage of using such an approach is that it addresses the uncertainty issue of the aircraft
trajectory. The downside is that it increases the computational effort of the algorithm which
becomes a key issue when facing increased numbers of aircraft.
4.2.6 Satisficing Approach
Satisficing game theory is a centralized multiagent approach to the resolution of aircraft con-
flict presented by Archibald [14]. Collisions are avoided by the joint actions of individual
aircraft. The aircraft actions are determined from two properties, namely, the Selectability and
Rejectability of the particular heading option for that aircraft. At every time stamp, there are five
directional options: ±2.5 degree, ±5 degree, 0 degree. The direction of aircraft is determined
by utilizing these two properties. The calculation of Selectability is based on how direct the
heading option is to the desired destination as well as the heading options that are in conflict
with each other. The Rejectability calculation is based on the heading options that conflict
with current headings of other aircraft. The fundamentally difference between the satisficing
approach and other conflict resolution approaches is that the satisficing approach does not aim to
find a “best” solution. Instead, each aircraft determines a set of acceptable avoidance maneuvers
by eliminating from the full set of options as many bad choices as possible based on safety and
efficiency concerns. The heading can then be chosen from the remaining alternatives according
to different needs. The downside of this approach is the increasing computational effort when
facing increased numbers of aircraft.
4.2.7 Delay based Ranking Separation Algorithm
The delay based ranking separation algorithm proposed by Qian Hui in 2008 is a centralized
approach [71]. It is similar to the Satisficing approach discussed above, in the sense of ordering
the priority of a limited list of possible heading changes. The rank of each aircraft is based on
their flight hours and their delay. After the rank of each aircraft is determined, their individual
heading change can then be selected from 5 different heading change options, 0 degree, ±2.5
degree, ±5 degree, in order of preference. The basic principle of selection is based on conflict
detection; however, the aircraft only needs to consider the conflicts involving the higher rank
ones. Therefore, the order of determining heading change is based on their rank. If all five
heading change options for a particular aircraft will all result in a conflict, the higher rank
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Figure 4.2: Process of Delay based Ranking Separation Algorithm
aircraft will need to select its heading change again. This process goes on until all aircraft have
successfully selected their own heading change. The drawback of this approach is the excessive
computational effort required when the aircraft numbers increase.
4.2.8 Other Techniques
Some other techniques for centralized separation management include: cost graphs method [72];
multi-party algorithm collision avoidance (MPCA) approach [73] and cooperative geometric
optimization algorithm [61].
4.3 Separation Management Approaches in NextGen and SESAR
NextGen and SESAR have been compared in a recent study [74], Operational performance for
the methods proposed by NextGen and SESAR are continuously evaluated and compared by
the Performance Review Commission, a joint effort between the FAA and EUROCONTROL.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also recommended to improve the
information exchange between NextGen and SESAR to improve the interoperability of the two
projects [75].
Although the basic concept is fundamentally the same, SESAR, being a more decentralized
model, calls for the establishment of a Reference Model for data normalization and stan-
dardization. While NextGen, envisioning a more centralized approach describing not only
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data but the provision of ”information services” in a networked environment [74]. In order
to achieve a high level of safety in both concepts, separation management must be consid-
ered. Such as the en-route Decision Support Tools that is being deployed to support NextGen
separation(URET/ERAM) [76] and separation management capabilities for SESAR, which is
developed under the FASTI project [77]. Both concepts call for systems to make use of central-
ized and decentralized services, delivered in a network enabled environment. Therefore, both
NextGen and SESAR will have to deal with identical problems in terms of communications
issues.
4.4 Summary
This chapter presented a comprehensive literature review related to separation management
system approaches. A number of state-of-the-art separation management approaches were
discussed. Figure 4.3 shows an overview of separation management approaches. Furthermore,
some literature was identified as the basis for the new proposed separation system. The specific
approaches used in this study will be tested and compared in Chapter 6 (as identified in Figure
4.3). Chapter 5 will discuss the Risk-Ratio concepts in relation to measurement uncertainty and
separation management systems.
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Figure 4.3: Knowledge map of literature review for separation management approaches
58 CHAPTER 4. REVIEW OF SEPARATION MANAGEMENT APPROACHES
Chapter 5
Measurement Uncertainty and Separation
Management System: Risk-Ratio Concepts
One of the primary desired abilities of any future air traffic separation management system is the
ability to provide early conflict detection and resolution effectively and efficiently. This chapter
considers the risk of conflict as a primary measurement to be used for early conflict detection.
When estimating the risk of conflict, sensor measurement uncertainty cannot be neglected. This
chapter proposes a novel approach to assessing the impact of different measurement uncertainty
models on the estimated risk of conflict. The measurement uncertainty model can be used to
represent different sensor accuracy and sensor choices. The chapter is organized as follows:
Section 5.1 describes the past work conducted in the area of conflict risk and risk estimation.
Section 5.2 formulates the conflict estimation and risk-ratio concepts using a dynamic state
space model. Section 5.3 describes the particle filter implementation for the risk-ratio estimation
problem. Section 5.4 provides a simulation study that compares the impact of different sensor
choices on the estimated risk-ratio. Section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.1 Past Work
As discussed in Chapter 1 and 4, the aim of any separation management systems is to predict
if a conflict is going to occur, and communicate any detected conflicts to a human operator to
assist in the resolution of the conflict situation [31]. To successfully detect a conflict, the traffic
environment must be first monitored, then appropriate state information must be collected and
disseminated using sensors and appropriate communication equipment. The collected state
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information provides an estimate of the current traffic situation. An aircraft dynamic model
is also needed to project any state knowledge into the future so that it is possible to predict
whether a conflict will occur at some future time epoch. Such a prediction can be solely based
on collected state information or may be based on additional information, such as flight plans
or knowledge of sensor accuracy. However, there is generally some uncertainty in the values of
the collected states due to sensor errors or limited update rate [31].
Risk of conflict is defined as the product of the probability and consequences of the conflict
event [18]. Generally, risk of conflict cannot be determined directly, because the probability
of the conflict event is difficult to quantify. There has been some research on improved quan-
tification of the risk of conflict over the past decade; however, research on the estimated risk
of conflict has often focused on different aspects and from different perspectives [18]. Young,
for example, describes risk concept using measurement of new technologies’ readiness level
(TRLs) [78]. Young’s risk concept has been used to assess the maturity of new technologies
as a means of evaluating their readiness for incorporation in new aircraft systems. Rather
than quantifying the estimated risk itself, Young focuses on presenting a framework which
captures the risk characterisation. Research in this area has usually approached the conflict risk
estimation problem using a probabilistic calculation method [18]. Most probabilistic calculation
methods do not require any additional information. As a result, the error in estimation tends
to grow quadratically with time [18]. However, some previous research has addressed the
importance of using additional information in estimating conflict risk [79]. One example of
using additional information to estimate the risk of conflict is to incorporate aircraft intent
information. By using additional intent information, unnecessary uncertainties in conflict risk
estimation can be reduced [79]. However, in the NextGen concept, aircraft intent information
could dynamically change over time. Thus a key limitation of this approach is that the quality
of estimated risk of conflict information depends on the accuracy of the intent information.
5.2 Problem Formulation and Definition of Assessment Criteria
5.2.1 Risk of Conflict Estimation
This chapter classifies aircraft into two basic types: observer aircraft and target aircraft which
were detailed in Chapter 2. The distance between the target aircraft and an observer aircraft
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D(xrt , x
1
t ) can be written as:
D(xrt , x
1
t ) =
√
(xrt (1)− x1t (1))2 + (xrt (3)− x1t (3))2, (5.1)
The estimated risk of conflict is based on the knowledge of the current state and any additional
information that may be available.
The conflict between a target aircraft and an observer aircraft is defined by an indicator
function C(·, ·) which indicates whether a conflict exists between the two aircraft:
C(xrt , x
1
t ) ,

1, if D(xrt , x
1
t ) ≤ Dcr
0, Otherwise,
(5.2)
where C(·, ·) is a function of the states xrt and x1t , and Dcr is defined as the critical separation
distance.
We will let Pr(C(xrt , x
1
t )) denote the probability of the conflict event at time instant t. Now
risk of conflict Rt can be defined based on this conflict probability, as the product of conflict
event cost Bc and the probability of the conflict event as follows:
Rt(x
r
t , x
1
t ) = Bc × Pr(C(xrt , x1t )). (5.3)
To allow us to consider the impact of different models on estimated risk of conflict, λ is
introduced to denote the model under consideration. The estimated risk of conflict based on
observed information can be expressed as:
Rτ |t(λ) = E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ], (5.4)
where E[Rτ (xrτ , x
1
τ )|y0,t, λ] is the expected value of Rτ at time instant τ , based on measure-
ments up to time t using model λ. Here τ = t + ` and ` ∈ [0, Tp] represents the prediction
length, and Tp is the upper limit of the prediction length. Whilst Rτ |t(λ) is estimated risk of
conflict at time instant τ , it is also important to estimate the risk of conflict during the next
period of time. To describe the worst conflict situation during the period [t, t + Tp], we define
the future estimated risk of conflict as the maximum estimated risk of conflict that occurs during
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the period [t, t + Tp] which is indicated by superscript m, this future estimated risk of conflict
can be expressed as:
Rmt|Tp(λ) = max
`∈[0,Tp]
Rt+`|t(λ), (5.5)
5.2.2 The Risk-Ratio Concept
Risk-ratio is a relative measure of the safety benefit brought about in a given environment by
changes in the procedure or equipment [80]. For air traffic separation management systems,
safety is measured in terms of the estimated risk of conflict [81]. When we want to evaluate the
utility of a model λ, it may be useful to quantify its performance by a nominal model (λ◦) using
the concept of risk-ratio. For these reasons, the risk-ratio on interval [t, t + Tp] will be defined
as:
Ft|Tp(λ, λ
◦) =
Rmt|Tp(λ)
Rmt|Tp(λ
◦)
, (5.6)
where Rmt|Tp(λ), defined by equation (5.5), is the future estimated risk of conflict using model
under test.
5.3 Calculation of Risk-Ratio using Particle Filters
In order to compute the estimated risk of conflict, the probability of conflict needs to be esti-
mated first. In general, it is difficult to evaluate Pr(C(·, ·)) analytically [43]. A particle filter
approach can be used to numerically estimate Pr(C(·, ·)). Particle filter is an approximate
non-linear filter for discrete time nonlinear state-space models, relating a hidden state xk to the
observation yk [82]. By using particle filter algorithms, the approach can be applied to more
general cases than is possible using Kalman filter based concepts.
5.3.1 Particle Filter Algorithm
Let us consider tracking N target aircraft. For this purpose, we allocate a set of M particles to
each tracked target aircraft r. The states for mth particle that tracks target aircraft r are denoted
by xm,rk . The particle filters first initialise all M particles based on the initial target aircraft
state’s probability density function (PDF). The particle filter then iterates four steps every time
instant k [8].
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5.3.2 Conflict Risk Estimation
Particle filters can be used to estimate the states of the aircraft and predict future state infor-
mation based on current and past observation. State predictions after p time samples can be
evaluated with the reapplication of the time update algorithm in equation (2.11) p times [8].
From the particle filter output (xm,rk+1 and w
m,r
k+1|k), by predicting into the future p time samples,
the probability of conflict between the rth target aircraft and an observer aircraft Pr(C(xrτ , x
1
τ ))
can be estimated by summing up the product of individual particle’s weight wm,rk+p|k and its cor-
responding particle’s indicator function C(xm,rk+p, x
1
k+p) which can be calculated using equation
(5.2).
For computational reasons, discrete time analysis of concepts previously defined in contin-
uous time are introduced. We let Pr denote the probability of the conflict event, and be written
as:
Pr(C¯(x
r
k+p, x
1
k+p)) = E[Pr(C(x
r
τ , x
1
τ ))], (5.7)
where C¯(xrk+p, x
1
k+p) is the mean of the indicator value for conflict between target aircraft r and
the observer aircraft (1). Sampling time instant k in equation (5.7) is the discrete representation
of continuous time t in equation (2.4) to (5.6). Prediction time p in equation (5.7) is the discrete
representation of prediction time l in continuous time that appeared in equation (5.5).
The probability of the conflict event can also be expressed as:
Pr(C¯(x
r
k+p, x
1
k+p)) =
∑M
m=1w
m,r
k+p|k × C(xm,rk+p, x1k+p)∑M
m=1w
m,r
k+m|k
, (5.8)
where k is the current time sample, and wm,rk+p|k represents the predicted conditional weighting
for the mth particle with prediction length p for target aircraft r(m = 1, 2, ...M ). In equation
(5.8), the indicator function C(xm,rk+p, x
1
k+p) gives an indication whether this particular particle is
in conflict with observer aircraft after p time samples.
The mean value of estimated risk of conflict at prediction time p from current time instant k
can then be re-expressed as :
R¯k+p|k =
∑M
m=1w
m,r
k+p|k × C(xm,rk+p, x1k+p)∑M
m=1w
m,r
k+p|k
×Bc, (5.9)
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where R¯k+p|k is the mean value of the estimated risk of conflict at p time interval from current
time instant k and Bc is the cost of conflict event. The discrete representation of risk-ratio on
interval [t, t+ Tp] is given by:
Fk|Tp(λ, λ
◦) = E[Ft|Tp(λ, λ
◦)], (5.10)
where Tp is the upper limit of the prediction length under consideration.
5.4 Simulation Study and Results
5.4.1 Simulation Implementation
The particle filters were implemented in the MATLAB R©simulation environment using ReBEL
version 0.2.7. ReBEL is a MATLAB R© toolkit of functions and scripts, designed to facilitate
sequential Bayesian estimation in general state space models [83]. The software consolidates
research on new methods for recursive Bayesian estimation and Kalman filtering.
5.4.2 Simulation Setup
In the following simulations, we consider different cases of one maneuvering target aircraft
observed by other nearby aircraft. The sensor under consideration is located on the observer
aircraft. The target aircraft dynamics are modeled in Cartesian coordinates as xk = Hxk−1 +
Gvk−1 where the states of the target are position and velocity in each of the two Cartesian
coordinates (x and y). Thus xk is a vector of dimension 4. The system matrices H and G are
defined as:
H =

1 T 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 T
0 0 0 1

, G =

T 2/2 0
T 0
0 T 2/2
0 T

, (5.11)
where T is the sampling period. The standard deviation of the process noise is 0.1.
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First, an evaluation for estimated risk of conflict in a single head-on collision case is con-
ducted, then, it followed by two other simulations. In the first simulation, state estimation for the
target was performed using a particle filter with four different measurement uncertainty models
which were introduced in Chapter 2. All simulations involve a critical separation distance of
500m. In the simulation, the target tracking algorithms were initialized near the actual target
states.
Four different scenarios were performed in the first simulation (Simulation 1). In each of the
scenarios, the observer aircraft travels from west to east and the target aircraft travels from east
with different bearing angles as indicated in Figure 5.1. The major difference between these
four scenarios is the minimum separation distance achieved between the observer aircraft and
target aircraft. Case I, II and III represent conflict cases, while Case IV represents a non-conflict
case. In all four cases, the target aircraft starts at a location approximately 2000m away from the
observer. The velocity of the observer aircraft and target aircraft are both 100 knots (51.4m/s)
[84]. All four different measurement uncertainty models were implemented and applied to the
scenarios to compare the impact of different sensor choices on future estimated risk of conflict.
In the second simulation (Simulation 2), we examined two different scenarios representing
a conflict case and a non-conflict case (as shown in Figure 5.2) and compared the impact of
varying range or bearing accuracy on the future estimated risk of conflict using the risk-ratio
concepts. The target aircraft started at a location approximately 1500m away from the observer
aircraft. The observer aircraft had a bearing angle of 45 degrees for the conflict case and 30
degrees for the non-conflict case. The target aircraft traveled from south to north, the velocity
of the observer aircraft and target aircraft were both set to 100knots (51.4m/s).
5.4.3 Simulation Results
5.4.3.1 Particle Filter Risk Prediction
In order to establish the relationship between time-to-conflict and quality of estimated risk of
conflict, we evaluated the estimated risk of conflict R¯k+p|k, as defined by equation (5.9), for
a simple head-on collision case. Figure 5.3 shows that the estimated risk of conflict R¯k+p|k
decreases as the prediction interval p increases. This occurs because the certainty in estimated
risk of conflict increases as range decreases. However, the aircraft could declare a conflict
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Figure 5.1: Head on Conflicts: Figure shows trajectories for four different scenarios
respectively (Simulation 1). Each black aircraft represents the target aircraft in a different
scenario labeled Case I, Case II, Case III and Case IV. The white aircraft represents the observer
aircraft which is the same in each scenario. The circle represent the critical separation distance
for the observer aircraft at one particular time instant. The minimum separation distance
achieved in these four scenarios are 46m, 234m, 488m and 547m respectively, Case I, Case
II and Case III represent conflict cases and Case IV represents a non-conflict case.
Figure 5.2: Crossing Conflict: Figure shows the trajectories for two different scenarios
(Simulation 2), the black aircraft represents the target aircraft which is the same in each scenario.
The white aircraft represents the observer aircraft in two scenarios Case I and Case II. The circle
represent the critical separation distance for the target aircraft at one particular time instant.
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Figure 5.3: Estimated risk of conflict at time instant k, prediction time p. Color bar red indicates
a higher value of risk while blue indicates a lower value of risk.
Table 5.1: Table of future estimated risk of conflict R¯m10|20 and risk-ratio F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) with four
different measurement uncertainty models in conflict case.
Sensor Choices
Case
Bearing only
(λ◦)
Radar ADS-B
ADS-B +
Radar
Future Estimated I 0.53± 0.01 0.76± 0.01 0.65± 0.02 0.86± 0.01
risk-of-conflict II 0.45± 0.01 0.70± 0.02 0.60± 0.02 0.75± 0.02
R¯m10|20 III 0.32± 0.01 0.50± 0.02 0.50± 0.02 0.49± 0.03
Risk I 1 1.444±0.004 1.226±0.005 1.625±0.004
Ratio II 1 1.555±0.008 1.323±0.008 1.659±0.009
F¯10|20(λ, λ◦) III 1 1.576±0.038 1.591±0.038 1.541±0.038
earlier; with lower confidence, if earlier declaration is required to ensure that there is sufficient
time to execute a suitable avoidance maneuver. Therefore, there is a trade-off between time-
to-conflict and accuracy of estimated risk of conflict. In order to get an accurate estimate
risk of conflict value (with sufficient time to resolve the conflict), we need to understand how
different measurement uncertainty models impact on estimated risk of conflict. The relationship
between measurement uncertainty models and estimated risk of conflict is further explored in
the following subsection.
5.4.3.2 Risk-Ratio Comparison for Sensor Choices
In the first simulation, risk-ratio concepts are used to assess the impact of sensor choice on
the future estimated risk-of-conflict. In this study, sensor accuracy is set to RNP-1 (which
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Table 5.2: Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m10|20 and risk-ratio F¯10|20(λ, λ
◦) with four
different measurement uncertainty models in non-conflict case
Sensor Choices
Case
Bearing only
(λ◦)
Radar ADS-B
ADS-B +
Radar
R¯m10|20 IV 0.086±0.014 0.067±0.010 0.073±0.015 0.035±0.006
F¯10|20(λ, λ◦) IV 1 0.779±0.002 0.849±0.004 0.407±0.001
corresponding to a standard deviation of 944.92m for latitude, longitude, range measurements
and 0.492rad for bearing angle measurements). The future estimated risk-of-conflict Rmt|Tp is
computed at t = 10 seconds using a maximum prediction length of Tp = 20 seconds. Table 5.1
provides the results for the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk ratios F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦),
as defined in equation (5.10), for the four measurement uncertainty models in conflict cases.
Case I to Case III are conflict cases in which the maximum value for conflict indicator function
from 10th to 30th time instant is equal to 1 (this is what conflict means). Bearing-only sensor
model is considered to be the the nominal model for the risk-ratio comparison study. Similarly,
Table 5.2 provides the results for the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk ratios
F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦) for four measurement uncertainty models in the non-conflict case. The value for
conflict indicator function during 10th to 30th time instant for the non-conflict case is 0 (this is
what non-conflict means).
For all conflict cases, a risk-ratio higher than 1 indicates better risk estimates than the
nominal model. A risk-ratio lower than 1 suggests that the model selected does not represent the
situation as accurately as the nominal model. For the non-conflict case, a risk-ratio lower than
1 indicates better risk estimation than under the nominal model. In this situation, cases when
the risk-ratio is higher than 1 suggests that the model selected does not represent the situation
as accurately as the nominal model.
From Table 5.1, we observed that the bearing-only sensor model performed slightly worse
than the other 3 sensor models, whilst ADS-B, radar and ADS-B + Radar model achieved
similar performance. Furthermore, for the same sensor choice and sensor accuracy, conflict
geometry also effects the ability to accurately estimate the future risk-of-conflict. In conflict
cases when the minimum separation distance achieved is close to the critical separation distance,
the estimation accuracy for future risk-of-conflict is reduced. This reduction in performance is
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Table 5.3: Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with
varying bearing parameter A in a non-conflict case
A 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0 0.000± 0.000 0.003± 0.001 0.083± 0.014 0.222± 0.032
F¯5|20(λ, λ◦) 0 0.039± 0.002 1 24.301±0.080 64.563±0.200
Table 5.4: Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with
varying range parameter B in a non-conflict case
B 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0 0.002± 0.001 0.004± 0.001 0.016± 0.003 0.084± 0.012
F¯5|20(λ, λ◦) 0 0.419± 0.003 1 3.605± 0.016 18.73± 0.079
evident when comparing future estimated risk-of-conflict in different conflict cases.
5.4.3.3 Risk-Ratio Comparison for Sensor Accuracy
In the second simulation, risk-ratio concepts are used to assess the impact of sensor accuracy
on the future estimated risk-of-conflict. Nominal sensor accuracy of RNP-1 is used in these
simulations. In this simulation, conflict occurs when the minimum distance achieved between
observer and target aircraft is less than 500m. The future estimated risk-of-conflict Rmt|Tp is
computed at t = 5 second with a maximum prediction length of Tp = 20 seconds. Here we
defineA andB as the bearing and range accuracy modification factors respectively (e.g. A = 10
is equivalent to a bearing accuracy of RNP-10). By choosing different values for A and B, we
can model the impact of different radar bearing and range observation accuracies. The future
estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk-ratio F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦) compared with the nominal model is
shown in Table 5.3 while the parameter A varies from 0.01 to 100 and parameter B is fixed to 1.
Table 5.4 compares the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯mt|Tp and risk-ratio F¯t|Tp(λ, λ
◦) when
varying parameter B from 0.01 to 100 (A = 1).
For the non-conflict case in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, a risk-ratio lower than 1 indicates improved
quality of future estimated risk-of-conflict when compared to the performance achieved under
the nominal model. In cases when the risk-ratio is higher than 1 indicates a lower quality
of estimated risk-of-conflict compared to the performance achieved under the nominal model.
When either parameter A or B are decreased, as seen in Table 5.3 and Table 5.4, resulted a
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Table 5.5: Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20, and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with
varying parameter A in a conflict case
A 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0.850±0.032 0.742±0.036 0.536±0.028 0.432±0.017 0.469±0.013
F¯5|20(λ, λ◦) 1.586±0.001 1.386±0.001 1 0.807±0.001 0.876±0.001
Table 5.6: Table of future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20 and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ
◦) with
varying parameter B in a conflict case
B 0.01 0.1 1 (λ◦) 10 100
R¯m5|20 0.843±0.024 0.639±0.031 0.536±0.028 0.399±0.015 0.482±0.011
F¯5|20(λ, λ◦) 1.573±0.001 1.192±0.001 1 0.744±0.001 0.899±0.001
better future estimated risk-of-conflict value. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 also demonstrate that a false
alarm could possibly be produced if excessive measurement noise was present in the Figure 5.2
simulation 2 (e.g. a large A or B value).
When comparing the radar accuracy impact on the future estimated risk-of-conflict and
risk-ratio in a conflict case, the minimum separation distance achieved during the simulation is
459m. Table 5.5 compares the future estimated risk-of-conflict and risk-ratio when varying the
A factor from 0.01 to 100 (B = 1). Table 5.6 shows the future estimated risk-of-conflict R¯m5|20
and risk-ratio F¯5|20(λ, λ◦) for a varying B factor from 0.01 to 100 in a conflict case (A = 1).
In conflict cases, a risk-ratio higher than 1 indicates improved future estimated risk-of-conflict
when compared to performance achieved under the nominal model. A risk-ratio lower than 1
indicates that the model selected does not represent the situation as accurately as the nominal
model.
Table 5.3-5.6 also show a marginal decrease in the error between future estimated risk-
of-conflict and the corresponding conflict indicator function in cases where a greater sensor
accuracy is used. For example, for a measurement uncertainty model in which sensor accuracy
is equal to RNP-0.1, the quality of future estimated risk-of-conflict is only marginal lower than
that obtained in model where sensor accuracy is equal to RNP-0.01. This observation implies
that sensors do not need to be excessively accurate in order to obtain a good quality future
estimated risk-of-conflict. It is also evident from Table 5.3-5.6 that within the same sensor
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choice, higher sensor accuracy corresponds to a more accurate future estimated risk-of-conflict.
5.4.4 Discussion of Results
The results from our simulations can be interpreted in the following three ways.
Firstly, in terms of prediction horizon, the results of the simulation study suggest that sensor
accuracy affects the length over which reliable prediction is possible. In other words, with
higher sensor accuracy, we can predict relatively further ahead in time.
Secondly, in terms of sensor choices, the radar observation model performs slightly better
in assessing the future estimated risk-of-conflict compared with the bearing-only sensor model,
as is expected because the radar observation model provides additional range information. The
risk-ratio analysis also shows that the radar model, ADS-B model and ADS-B+radar model have
similar performance in assessing the future estimated risk-of-conflict. The risk-ratio analysis
implies that the separation management system does not significantly benefit from additional
sensor measurements (if the additional sensors have similar accuracy, at the same data rate).
However, the aircraft separation management system can benefit from ADS-B’s high update
rates compared to the radar measurements. This risk-ratio approach helps to quantify the risk-
of-conflict benefits brought about by combining different sensor systems.
Thirdly, in terms of sensor accuracy, our simulation results show that estimation is improved
as sensor accuracy increases. The improved estimation characteristics are illustrated through
larger risk-ratios in conflict cases and smaller risk-ratios in non-conflict cases. However, the
simulation study also suggests that sensors do not need to be excessively accurate in order
to obtain reasonably accurate estimations of the risk-of-conflict. Furthermore, the study also
indicates that conflict geometry impacts accurate risk-of-conflict estimation, especially at the
boundary of the conflict zone.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter,a new risk-ratio based approach for assessing the impact of sensor accuracy and
sensor choice on the ability to accurately predict conflicts was proposed. The proposed risk-
ratio based approach was implemented using particle filter estimation and prediction techniques.
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Use of particle filters allows consideration of more complex aviation scenarios that include non-
linear characteristics of measurement devices. Next, in Chapter 6, additional insights into the
uncertain environment problem will bring forth by a comparison of separation performance
behavior of several popular algorithms in an uncertain communication environment.
Chapter 6
Communication Uncertainty and Separation
Management System: Five Approaches Compared
As noted in chapter 1, new air traffic automated separation management concepts are constantly
under investigation. Yet most of the automated separation management algorithms proposed
over the last few decades have assumed either perfect communication or exact knowledge of all
aircraft locations. In realistic environments, these idealized assumptions are not valid and any
communication failure can potentially lead to disastrous outcomes. This is a brief simulation
study chapter that examines the separation performance behavior of several popular algorithms
in an uncertain communication environment. The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.1
describes the past work conducted in the area of separation management systems. Section 6.2
compares the separation performance behavior of several popular algorithms during periods of
information loss. Section 6.3 describes the simulation study conducted. Section 6.4 draws some
conclusions.
6.1 Past Work
In recent years, air traffic management systems have faced increasing levels of air traffic de-
mands [85]. Current solutions to congestion problems have included building more facili-
ties, hiring more controllers and expanding existing Air Traffic Control technologies. These
patchwork solutions have been only marginally effective, at a huge cost. There is increasing
motivation to improve the efficiency of the air traffic management process by investigating
the use of automation technologies [86]. In this regard, there has been some notable work in
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the area of next generation air traffic management; two examples of these programs are the
SESAR project in Europe and the NextGen project in the US. These two projects are different
in scope, but they share a common understanding of a possible future air traffic management
capability, which would include automation functions that assist the decision making of air
traffic controllers. However if these automated concepts are to be adopted then the safe guards
that are present in current operational procedures will no longer be sufficient. This chapter is
specifically focused on the (automated) separation management system which has the task of
maintaining safe separation distances between aircraft and, in the event of a potential conflict
arising, this system also has the task of resolving conflicts in a safe manner. However if a
communication failure event occurs, there is a possibility that a given separation management
system might incorrectly handle the information available, and that these incorrect actions might
lead into a mid-air collision.
6.2 Existing Separation Management Algorithms
There is a need to develop an automated separation management approach that has robust
behavior with respect to the communication issues that arise in the uncertain communication
environments. For this purpose, we present a simulation study that investigates the performance
of several separation management approaches during communication failure. Whilst the com-
plete loss of a central communication network would clearly cause total failure of centralized
separation management, our simulation study also suggests that loss of communication with
just one aircraft may significantly reduce the performance of both centralized and decentralized
separation management algorithms. The study also suggests that the degree of performance
degradation depends on the nature of the air traffic scenario.
In the study presented in this chapter, two centralized separation management and three
decentralized separation management approaches are examined and compared. Details of each
these algorithms can be found in Chapter 4. The following algorithms are examined:
1. Centralized separation management approaches
(a) Satisficing Approach [14]
(b) Delay Ranking Approach [71]
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2. Decentralized separation management approaches
(a) Decentralized Reactive Collision Avoidance Approach [15]
(b) Myopic Decentralized Approach [50]
(c) Look-ahead Decentralized Approach [50]
6.3 Simulation Study
Five of the selected separation management algorithms were simulated, the evaluation was
carried out using the following implementation choices.
6.3.1 Dynamics
The dynamics of each aircraft was represented using the simplified 3DOF kinematics model
presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.1. The control inputs ui are restricted to ui,min ≤ ui ≤ ui,max.
where ui,min and ui,max represents the minimum and maximum turning rate of the aircraft.
6.3.2 Traffic pattern Scenarios (Four Aircraft)
Figure 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 show the three scenario types were examined this study: the cross passing
scenario, the choke point scenario and the 4 vehicle mixed benchmark scenario. All aircraft used
are simulated to have constant speed si = 100m/s (which corresponds to 360km/hour and is
roughly representative of a GA Class aircraft). Control limits ui,min and ui,max were assumed
to be −5 degree/second and +5 degree/second, respectively (see [71] for justification).
6.3.3 Performance Metrics
Algorithms are compared on the basis of minimum separation distance. Other metrics such as
traffic complexity metric and route planning efficiency are meaningful but minimum separation
distance describes the most important algorithm characteristic.
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Figure 6.1: The Cross Passing Scenario
Figure 6.2: The Choke Point Scenario
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Figure 6.3: 4 Vehicle Mixed Benchmark Scenario
6.3.4 Simulation Results
This section describes the results of the simulation study in which the performance of the
five algorithms in a situation when a communication failure related to one of the aircraft has
occurred are compared. The data update rate of 2Hz was used in both simulations and the
desired separation distance was set to 400m.
6.3.4.1 Centralized Separation Management
In this part of the simulation study, two centralized approaches are compared: satisficing ap-
proach and delay ranking approach. Each of these separation algorithms was examined in
the three traffic pattern scenarios described in earlier. For each traffic pattern scenario, the
algorithms were examined in two information situations: perfect information situation, and
in the presence of a single uncooperative aircraft. An uncooperative aircraft is defined as an
aircraft that does not follow the separation instructions issued by the central controller (perhaps
this instruction was not received due to equipment failure on the aircraft). Table 6.1 shows the
separation distances achieved by the centralized separation management algorithms. Note that
both algorithms managed separation correctly when full information was available.
The impact of having a single uncooperative aircraft in these traffic patterns is evaluated
next. Table 6.2 shows the effective reduction in minimum separation distance caused by the
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Table 6.1: Performance of Centralized Separation Management Approaches (minimum
separation distance) in Perfect Information Situation
Performance (minimum
separation distance)
Choke Point Cross Passing Four Vehicle Mixed
Benchmark
Satisficing 456.4m 413.1m 453.1m
Delay Based 436.3m 434.1m 434.1m
Table 6.2: Centralized Separation Management: the reduction in separation distance due to an
uncooperative aircraft, a positive value means worse performance
Performance Degradation
(Compared to Table 6.1)
Choke Point Cross Passing Four Vehicle Mixed
Benchmark
Satisficing 247.6m 133.6m 130.0m
Delay Based 159.3m 35.0m 27.0m
single uncooperative aircraft (that is, minimum separation distance in the prefect information
case minus the minimum separation distance achieved in the presence of a single uncooperative
aircraft).
6.3.4.2 Decentralized Separation Management
The DRCA approach, the myopic approach and the look-ahead (LA) approach are compared.
Each of these separation algorithms was examined in the three traffic pattern scenarios de-
scribed in section 6.3.2. For each traffic pattern scenario, the algorithms were examined in two
information situations: perfect information, and in the presence of an uncooperative aircraft.
An uncooperative aircraft here is defined as an aircraft that cannot perform decentralized sep-
aration management (perhaps on-board sensors are not functioning correctly) Such an aircraft
is assumed to maintain straight flight. Table 6.3 shows the separation distances achieved by
the decentralized separation management algorithms when all four aircraft all fully operational.
Both the Myoptic and Look-ahead approaches failed in the cross passing pattern (even when
all aircraft at fully operational). We next evaluated the impact of having a single uncooperative
aircraft in these traffic patterns. Table 6.4 shows the effective reduction in minimum separation
distance caused by the single uncooperative aircraft (that is, minimum separation distance in the
prefect information case minus the minimum separation distance achieved in the presence of a
single uncooperative aircraft). Two cases in which the separation distance increased actually
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Table 6.3: Performance of Decentralized Separation Management approaches (minimum
separation distance) in Perfect Information Situation
Performance (minimum
separation distance)
Choke Point Cross Passing Four Vehicle Mixed
Benchmark
DRCA 399.6m 423.6m 401.4m
Myopic 399.8m 26.5m 398.6m
LA 398.5m 33.5m 400.4m
Table 6.4: Decentralized Separation Management: the reduction in separation distance due to
an uncooperative aircraft, a positive value means worse performance
Performance Degradation
(Compared to Table 6.3)
Choke Point Cross Passing Four Vehicle Mixed
Benchmark
DRCA 131.9m 23.0m 0.7m
Myopic 1.3m −72.2m 231.3m
LA 0.0m −65.2m 15.5m
corresponded to the case when separation failed in the fully operational case.
6.3.5 Summary of Simulation Study
The results given in the Table 6.1 and 6.2 suggest that centralized separation approaches tend
to have a degraded performance if there is communication loss in one of the aircraft in the
airspace. The main reason for this degraded performance is that these approaches assume
perfect communication. It would expected that performance to be even worse if additional
aircraft have communication problems. Table 6.3 and 6.4 highlight that some traffic patterns
are difficult for decentralized approaches (even for fully operational aircraft); however, there is
some suggestion that decentralized approaches may be slightly less sensitive to communication
failure.
6.4 Summary
This chapter compared the impact of communication loss on several existing automated separa-
tion management approaches. Our studies showed that these algorithms all exhibit significantly
degraded performance when communication failure occurs, centralized separation approaches
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tend to have worse degraded performance compared with decentralized approaches, it suggests
that decentralized approaches may be slightly less sensitive to communication failure. However
some traffic patterns are difficult for decentralized approaches. Performance would expected
to be even worse for both centralized and decentralized approaches if additional aircraft have
communication problems. This chapter provides foundation to the new automated separation
management concepts that will be proposed in chapter 7.
Chapter 7
Communication Uncertainty and Separation
Management System: Proposed Safety Augmented
System and Flight Test Results
Future air traffic management concepts often involve the proposal of automated separation
management algorithms that replace human air traffic controllers. This chapter proposes a
new type of automated separation management algorithm (based on the satisficing approach
[14]) that utilizes inter-aircraft communication and a track file manager (or bank of Kalman
filters) and is capable of resolving conflicts during periods of communication failure. The
proposed separation management algorithm is tested in a range of flight scenarios involving
periods of communication failure, in both simulation and flight test (flight tests were conducted
as part of the Smart Skies project [87] 1). The chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.1
describes the background knowledge. Section 7.2 proposes a new type of automated separation
management algorithm. Section 7.3 presents a simulation study. Section 7.4 describes two
flight tests. Section 7.5 provides flight testing results for the proposed new type of automated
separation management systems. Section 7.6 draws some conclusions.
7.1 Background
Air traffic management has faced significant traffic growth over the past decade. Future ATM
systems will need to handle this growth in increased demand, while at the same time, maintain
1A three-year, multi-award winning international project that researched and developed new technologies.
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or even improve the level of safety [87]. In these future ATM systems, communication links are
vital components because they allow for information sharing, situation awareness and air traffic
separation management commands to be issued. Previously, it has been observed that in order
to enhance the safety, efficiency and capacity, next generation air traffic management algorithms
will need to be robust against communication issues [84, 88]. In Chapter 6, we examined the
benefits of switching between centralized and decentralized separation management algorithms.
In this chapter we will examine the benefits of using inter-aircraft communication. There are
two main ways to maintain situation awareness during the event of communication failure. In
the first type of approach, using the prediction capabilities of filters, an on-board air-traffic
picture can be maintained using a track file manager that predicts future air-traffic location
information on the basis of previously received aircraft location information. However, the
key drawback of this approach is that the error in predicted aircraft position tends to grow
as time elapses following the communication failure event. In the second type of approach,
new information is used to update air traffic picture (information that can be gaining through
additional on-board sensors or via information shared over inter-aircraft communication links).
One example of this second type of approach is the additional information that is provided
by the automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) system; ADS-B is a cooperative
surveillance technique for air traffic control in which an ADS-B-equipped aircraft determines its
own position using a global navigation satellite system and periodically broadcasts this position
and other relevant information to potential ground stations and other aircraft with ADS-B-in
equipment. In alternative situations, extra or new air traffic information might be requested
via inter-platform communication (link2000+, a European pioneer air traffic management);
other possible resources of traffic information includes on-board Radar or EO sensors. The
range of possible communication systems currently available suggests that in the near future
it may be routine to request critical information from nearby aircraft through suitable peer-
to-peer communication links, and that this new information will be used in support of air
traffic separation during any periods of failure in the centralized communication network. In
this chapter we propose the use of a safety augmentation system containing a decentralized
separation management system involving a track file manager, an on-board conflict detection
system, and a separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach. The proposed
system will provide separation support during a period of central communication network
failure (by switching to a safe decentralized mode of operation that offers separation protection
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through the use of inter-aircraft communication).
Safety in air traffic operations is generally understood to involve the five layers of safety
processes and systems that are shown earlier in Figure 1.1 [89]. These five layers provide
multiple levels of collision protection and, as such, each of these layers would have to fail in
order for a mid-air collision to occur. This layered approach starts in Layer 1 which contains the
basic procedures and structure of airspace management (aspects such as predefined operational
altitudes and predefined flight routes) that provides the basic framework for air-traffic operation.
In the 2nd and 3rd layers a centrally located air traffic management system (human operators
and ground-based radar systems) performs aircraft traffic separation management. Layers 4 and
5 related to emergency safety systems that are beyond the scope of this study. This research is
specifically focused on (automated) separation management (in the 2nd and 3rd layers) which is
the task of maintaining safe separation distances between aircraft and, in the event of a potential
conflict arising, this system also has the task of resolving conflicts in a safe manner. However
if a communication failure event occurs (such as the failure of receiver or transmitter hardware
or a failure of the ground based radar system), then there is a possibility that a centralized ATM
system might incorrectly handle the information available, and that this incorrect response might
lead into a mid-air collision. For these reasons, we will examine the separation management
problem in an environment involving possible periods of communication failure. That is, the
systems we investigated must operate in two environments:
• A normal operating environment; and
• A communication failure operating environment.
In a normal operating environment, the central information network is assume to be pre-
sented and functional in the sense that it allows separation commands to be transmitted to all
air traffic. For our purposes here, we will assume that air-traffic picture used for centralized
separation management is perfect; that is all aircraft information is known by the centralized
separation manager. We will also assume that ideal communication with aircraft occurs which
means neither delay/loss packets nor noise is introduced into the problem.
In a communication failure operating environment, the central information network is as-
sumed to have lost connection with all aircraft; in this case, we assume all aircraft operate
without any situation awareness information being provided by the central ATM system. We
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Figure 7.1: Automated separation management system overview
Figure 7.2: The automated separation management system architecture with phantom aircraft
boundary
will assume that inter-aircraft communication exists.
7.2 Proposed separation management system
An overview of the separation management system is provided in Figure 7.1. Figures 7.2
and 7.3 both represent the automated separation management system architecture, but with
different perspectives. Figure 7.2 outlines the phantom aircraft boundary and Figure 7.3 shows
the realization of the system architecture by identifying the Matlab boundary.
The proposed on-board decentralized separation management system involves: a) track
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Figure 7.3: The automated separation management system architecture with Matlab boundary
file manager; b) request/response system; c) a conflict detection system; and d) a separation
manager as shown in Figure 7.4. We now separately describe each of the components:
7.2.1 Track file manager
The track file manager involves a bank of Kalman filters and also includes algorithms that
perform data association, track initialization and track termination processing. At the core of
the track file manager there is one Kalman filter for each aircraft in the airspace. The state
of each Kalman filter describes the position and velocity vector of the aircraft. The track file
manager operates in both normal and failure environments. In particular, the track file manager
operates during the normal communication environment so that a current picture of air-traffic is
available if the centralized communication network ever fails.
7.2.2 Request/response system
This module of the system manages communication with central air traffic manager and inter-
aircraft communication. For inter-aircraft communication purposes, the communication pro-
tocol contains a request message (that requests a position update from nearby aircraft) and
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Figure 7.4: On-board Decision System contains 4 main modules: a request/response system to
manage communication with central ATM or manage inter-aircraft communication, a track file
manager to maintain local situational awareness, a conflict detection system, and a decentralized
separation manager to determine suitable separation actions, when required.
response message. This system operates in both normal and failure environments.
7.2.3 Conflict detection system
The function of this module is to evaluate the air-traffic map, as described by the Kalman filter
bank; to determine if a potential conflict exists between this aircraft and any other aircraft in the
region. This system operates only in the failure environment.
7.2.4 Separation manager
The function of the separation management module is to determine suitable separation com-
mands to resolve any conflicts identified by the on-board conflict detection system. In this
research, the satisficing game theory (Described in Chapter 6) is the centralized multi-agent
approach used to resolve aircraft conflicts (but other separation algorithms might also be con-
sidered). This system operates only in the failure environment.
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Figure 7.5: Simulation Scenarios. These two scenarios represent the two simplest scenarios
under which a two-aircraft conflict can arise during communication failure.
Figure 7.6: Programming Interface
7.3 Simulation Study
We simulated the separation management system discussed above to evaluate its performance
in different scenarios. The dynamics of each simulated aircraft were represented using sophis-
ticated six degree of freedom (6DOF) C172 aircraft simulator developed in the University of
Sheffield [90]. All aircraft have a constant speed of 100 knots. Evaluation of the separation
management system will be based on the minimum separation distance achieved during the
simulation. Figure 7.5 shows the two scenario types that were examined in this study: one
turn into crossing conflict, and double turns into crossing conflict. These two encounters are
the topological equivalent to a range of encounters between two-aircraft (involving different
approach angles). The angle of approach in the encounter does not significantly impact the
issues considered in this chapter. Other realistic scenarios such as choke point, landing and
departing from airport should also be considered in the further study.
Figure 7.6 shows the programming interface between C++, Matlab and 6DOF C172 aircraft
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Figure 7.7: The basic function diagram for the separation system, refer to Appendix A for
details.
simulator and Figure 7.7 shows the basic function diagram for the separation system.
In Figure 7.7, the term PTAD refers to predicted position information. CTAD refers to
command information. SATAD refers to situational awareness information. Position3D refers
to a structure contains GPS location information. Flight Plan refers to flight plan information of
a particular aircraft. Table A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4 and A.5 in the appendix list the structure element
of PTAD, CTAD, SATAD, Position3D and Flight Plan respectively.
7.3.1 Simulation results
For each of the traffic pattern scenario, algorithms were examined in the two operational modes:
normal operating environment and failure operating environment. In each operational mode,
for each traffic scenario, we compared a pure centralized approach with the new proposed
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Table 7.1: Normal Operating Environment Performance (Separation distance achieved)
Case for Normal Op-
erating Environment
One Turn One Turn
Case 2
Double
Turn
Double
Turn Case 2
Pure centralized 2632m 2144m 1752m 1832m
Pure decentralized 4551m 4423m 3383m 3462m
Table 7.2: Failure Operating Environment Performance (Separation distance achieved)
Case for Failure Oper-
ating Environment
One Turn One Turn
Case 2
Double
Turn
Double
Turn Case 2
Without inter-aircraft
communication
2777m 3017m 42m 58m
With inter-aircraft com-
munication
3683m 3815m 3453m 3312m
system both with and without access to inter-aircraft communication. In these simulations,
all aircraft are assumed to have initial communication with central information network, and
it was assumed that central information network failure occurs just before the aircraft turns
commence. During the failure period, all aircraft traffic information is propagated in track
file managers on-board each aircraft. This on-board air-traffic picture is used for conflict
detection. When inter-aircraft communication is available, any information communicated to an
aircraft is used in its on-board track file managers, and hence impacts on conflict detections and
separation management commands that this aircraft generates. Table 7.1 shows the separation
distance achieved (during normal communication network operation) by the original centralized
separation management and a pure decentralized separation management approach. Table 7.2
shows the separation distances achieved (during communication network failure) by the new
proposed approach with/without inter-aircraft communication (separation is deemed to have
been maintained if separation distance is kept greater than 1500m)
The results given in Table 7.1 show that the decentralized separation management system
achieved separation distances significantly larger than required minimum separation distances,
corresponding to large heading deviations from original trajectory (these large deviations are
undesirable). These large deviations suggest that a pure decentralized approach is not desirable.
The results given in Table 7.2 suggest that, in two-aircraft scenario, the aircraft will be able
to resolve potential conflicts even during a communication network failure with the help of
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Table 7.3: Flight Test Setups common to both Flight test 1 and 2
Aircraft Cessna 172R
Aircraft Communication Equipment Next-G Modem
Communication Requirement Internet through UMTS HSDPA Network using
850MHz band
Software Requirement Mixed modules in both C++ and Matlab
(Version 7.5) with instrument toolbox
Sheffield 6DOF Aircraft Simulator
Location Burrandowan near Kingaroy Airport (GPS
Location: -26.5808333, 151.8411111)
Computer Specification CPU:AMD Athlon 64 3200+ 2GHz
Memory: 512MB
Hard Drive: 80GB
Operating System: Microsoft Windows XP
decentralized separation management on the basis of propagated traffic information (without
the need for new information), as long as only one aircraft changes their course after network
failure. However if both aircraft change their course during the period of communication
blackout then it is possible for conflict to occur if no additional information is obtained from
inter-aircraft communication. However, successful separation could be achieved in the double
turn case (even during communication failure) if additional information was provided by inter-
aircraft communication.
7.4 Flight Tests Setup
Two rounds of flight tests were conducted. The primary purpose of our initial flight tests was to
provide preliminary verification of our new architecture, while the purpose for our second flight
tests were to provide verification of our new proposed safety augmentation separation system.
The actual flight test will take place at Burrandowan Homestead with manned aircraft (AC)
flights originating and terminating from the Kingaroy Airport approximately 100 miles west
of Brisbane, Australia. The separation management system, running from ARCAA research
centre, will track and perform separation management for real and simulated aircraft flying
over Burrandowan area. The following tables detail the basic setups for both flight tests.
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Table 7.4: First Flight Test Details
Date Wednesday 16th Nov 2009
Start Time 8:30AM
Duration 2 hours and 15 minutes
Wind Condition (Pilot Estimation) 2000 feet 110◦ /15 knots
Table 7.5: Second Flight Tests Details
Date Thursday 27th May 2010
Start Time 9:00AM
Duration 4 hours
Wind Condition (Pilot Estimation) 3500ft 115◦ /15knots
7.5 Flight Tests
7.5.1 Flight Test: Verification of Experiment
The architecture was designed to provide a common environment for the development of can-
didate next generation separation management concepts (Only Satisficing approach was im-
plemented in this work) The flight test architecture is shown Figure 7.8. This development
environment allows both high fidelity simulation testing (6DOF dynamic models) and flight
testing of proposed algorithms, and includes:
• Several computers hosting parts of the system (remote hosting is possible),
• Specialized communication layers to manage air-traffic communication (both software
protocol interfaces and hardware), Communication occurs over 3.5G telephone data net-
works (or satellite networks).
• Specialized automated separation management approaches (based on satisficing approach,
but conforming to interfacing requirements) ,
• Specialized 6DOF simulation models for virtual aircraft (conforming to interfacing re-
quirements),
• [Optional] a Cessna 172R aircraft (equipped with specialized avionics such as high-grade
IMUs and various data connections).
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Figure 7.8: Overall System Architecture: Flight tests were conducted in Burrandowan area
(near Brisbane).[Left side image credit: Google Maps] Central communication network was
provided by mobile data network. This network connected the separation manager (in Brisbane)
with aircraft in the flight test area. Simulated aircraft developed by the University of Sheffield
were also involved in the flight test.
Note that the communication layer and other aspects of this architecture were developed as
part of the Smart Skies Project.
The Sheffield 6DOF Simulator has few assumptions and limitations. Firstly, the simulator
sustains a 50Hz update rate at all times. The simulator can be modified to run at higher
frame rates, however higher frame rates are dependent on the processor speed. Secondly,
the flight is a simplified model where the simulator linearised about one specific operating
point. Furthermore, the flight control laws in the Sheffield simulator are implemented in the
primary flight computer. This limits the implementation of different flight control laws. An
alternative approach is to develop the flight control laws in Matlab in a dedicated PC under
Linux or Windows, where packets are transmitted to the Matlab application once per frame; the
corresponding control surface positions are computed by the Matlab computer and transmitted
to the primary flight computer. This alternative approach enables different control laws to be
implemented in the simulator without any specific re-programming of the simulator.
The primary advantage of the developed architecture is that it allows us to first perform rapid
algorithm developments in a friendly simulation environment. Once verified in simulation,
we can then easily transition to actual flight testing (because our architecture will work with
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Table 7.6: A comparison study of simulation and real flight behavior, 3means satisfactory
separation was achieved in that test case; 7means that the minimum required separation distance
was not maintained; In the last row, 3/7denotes whether similar behavior was seen in both the
simulation and the flight tests
Case 22.5◦ 45◦ 67.5◦ 90◦ 112.5◦ 135◦ 157.5◦ 180◦
Simulation 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Flight Test 3 3 3 7 3 3 3 3
Similar 7 7 3 7 7 3 7 3
both simulated hardware and real hardware). The primary purpose of our initial flight tests
was to provide preliminary verification of our new architecture. A secondary purpose was to
evaluate how well our simulation models (primarily our 6DOF) match the real interactions
that occur during real conflict resolution. We stress that these tests did not aim to investigate
the impact of communication loss, and hence these first tests involved only simple conflicts
involving two aircraft approaching at a variety of different angles (from 22.5 degrees to 180
degrees in increments of 22.5 degrees). One aircraft was our specially equipped Cessna 172R
aircraft. The other aircraft was a computer simulation of an aircraft (that mimicked all the
required interfaces, the aerodynamic behavior and the response to separation instructions).
Table 7.6 shows a comparison, for different approach angles, between pure simulation tests
and flight tests involving one real aircraft (with real communication links) and one simulated
aircraft. In this table, in the 2nd and 3rd rows, a tick means satisfactory separation was achieved
in that test case; a cross means that the minimum required separation distance was not main-
tained. In the last row, the tick/cross denotes whether similar behavior was seen in both the
simulation and the flight tests.
To highlight some of the features present in real flight tests we will now describe some
of the data collected in the 67.5 degree approach angle case (other approach angles exhibited
similar features). Figure 7.9 shows the trajectories followed by the aircraft during this sce-
nario. The solid red trajectory corresponds to the real aircraft and the dash blue trajectory
corresponds to the simulated aircraft. We highlight that in this scenario both aircraft received
commands to change heading for the purposes of avoiding the potential collision identified;
the solid red aircraft is instructed to turn right so that it passes ahead of the dash blue aircraft
(which is also instructed to turn right so that it passes behind the solid red aircraft). Once the
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Figure 7.9: The resolved trajectories in the 67.5 degree scenario (real flight test). The real
aircraft is denoted in solid red (starting from the left end of its shown trajectory) and the
simulated aircraft is denoted in dash blue (starting from the top end of its shown trajectory).
Initial points of the aircraft are denoted with x and destination waypoints of the aircraft are
denoted with o. At the very left, some of the solid red (real) aircraft’s trajectory prior to the
experiment is shown (and should be ignored).
Figure 7.10: The real (red) aircraft heading commands are shown in red. The aircraft actual
heading is shown in blue
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potential conflict has been resolved, both aircraft head towards their original way-points. In
Figure 7.10 we show the commands issued and response behavior of the real (red) aircraft. In
this figure, the red tick marks correspond to time instants in which the centralized separation
manager issues a heading instruction to the real aircraft (the size of the tick corresponds to
the value of the heading instruction). These instructions are issued between 150s and 175s.
The aircraft’s actual heading is denoted by the blue line. In the shown scenario, the separation
instruction is issued several times, and adjusted, until the algorithm is happy that the aircraft
is on a conflict-free trajectory (in an approximate sense, this corresponds to aircraft’s heading
matching the heading instruction). The aircraft starts returning to its initial way-point at a time
of approximately 425 seconds. We highlight that during simulation of the 67.5 degree approach
case, a minimum separation distance of 1612.42m was achieved (the flight delay caused was 30
seconds). However, during the actual flight test, a minimum separation distance obtained was
2573.92m (the flight delay caused was 53 seconds). We highlight that the separation manager
used a similar separation strategy in both the simulation and flight test. Hence, whilst both tests
satisfy the desired separation distance of 1500m and used roughly a similar separation strategy,
significantly different performance numbers were seen in the two cases. In summary, this initial
flight test program illustrated the feasibility and provided preliminary validation of our new
architecture for testing new automated separation management concepts. However, this initial
test also highlights that simulation environments only provide a crude approximation of flight
behavior during conflict and avoidance.
7.5.2 Flight Test of Proposed System
The proposed separation management system was also examined in flight tests. Table 7.7 shows
the test results obtained through flight test which involved one real aircraft and one simulated
aircraft. Note that the flight test cases marked with “X” were not performed due to the technical
issues.
The normal operation results given in Table 7.7 show that the decentralized separation
management system achieved separation distances significantly larger than required minimum
separation distances (1500m), corresponding to large heading deviations from original tra-
jectory (these large deviations are undesirable). These large deviations suggest that a pure
decentralized approach is not desirable.
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Table 7.7: Flight Test Separation Management Performance (Separation distance achieved),
note that the flight test cases marked with 7were not performed due to the technical issues.
Case One Turn One Turn
Case 2
Double
Turn
Double
Turn Case
2
Normal: Pure Centralized 2574m 2419m 1531m 1916m
Normal: Pure Decentralized 3715m 3470m 3764m 3613m
Failure Mode: Without inter-
aircraft communication
7 7 7 7
Failure Mode: With inter-
aircraft communication
7 7 7 2640m
Figure 7.11: The resolved flight test trajectories in the double turn into crossing conflict
scenario (Real flight test). The real aircraft is denoted in red (starting from the lower right
of its shown trajectory) and the simulated aircraft is denoted in blue (starting from the top left
of its shown trajectory). At lower right, some of the red (real) aircraft’s trajectory prior to the
experiment is shown (and should be ignored)
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Figure 7.12: The 6DOF aircraft actual heading is shown in blue, the vertical line denotes the
time that a conflict was detected, separation instruction were issued to the aircraft that cause the
aircraft to turn to a heading of −0.6 Rad.
The double turn case for failure mode with inter-aircraft communication in Table 7.7 sug-
gests that, successful separation could be achieved (even during communication failure) if
additional information was provided by inter-aircraft communication.
We will now describe some of the data collected for double turn case in a failure environment
operation, with access to inter-aircraft communication. Figure 7.11 shows the trajectories
followed by the aircraft during this scenario. The red trajectory corresponds to the real aircraft
and the blue trajectory corresponds to the simulated aircraft. We highlight that in this scenario
the central information network failed just before aircraft commenced their turns; therefore
neither aircraft was aware of the potential conflict until they were able to update their local air
traffic map using information received via inter-aircraft communication. In this situation with
inter-aircraft communication, the conflict is detected and resolved once the traffic map has been
updated in both of the decentralized separation management systems on each aircraft. Once
the potential conflict has been resolved, both aircraft return to flight towards their original way-
points. Figure 7.12 shows the trigged message from decentralized separation management and
response behavior of the 6DOF aircraft (the blue line), the red line corresponds to the time
instant in the conflict has been detected and the decentralized separation management starts
issuing separation instructions to the real aircraft. The instructions were issued at 217 seconds
into the flight test. 20 seconds after the trigged message, the aircraft achieves it separation
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instruction designed to avoid the detected collision. We highlight that during the flight test,
a minimum separation distance of 2640m was achieved and we highlight that there is no
significant difference between the performance of the simulation tests and the flight tests. In
summary, this flight test provided a preliminary validation of the new automated separation
management concepts. Since there is no significant different performance observed between
simulation and flight test, no further flight tests related to this experiment were conducted.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, a new safety augmentation system is proposed. The new system uses a decen-
tralized separation management system that involves a track file manager, an on-board conflict
detection system, and a separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach. Simu-
lation and flight tests showed that with the help of inter-aircraft communication, the proposed
separation management system was able to resolve potential conflict during a period of central
communication failure.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
The development, investigation and analysis of new automated separation management con-
cepts are the major outcomes of this research. This final chapter summarizes the results pre-
sented in this thesis in terms of following two main research questions identified in the intro-
duction chapter.
Question 1: How does the information about measurement uncertainty (i.e. sensor accuracy
and choices) impact the quality of our estimates of the risk of mid-air collision?
The first research question was resolved by utilizing risk ratio concept in our conflict risk
estimation. Our study demonstrated the value of modelling measurement uncertainty in the
conflict risk estimation problem and presented techniques providing a means of assessing sensor
requirements to achieve desired conflict detection performance.
Question 2: Can inter-aircraft communication be used to improve separation management sys-
tem performance during communication uncertainty environment (e.g. communication failure)?
The second research question was resolved in two steps. Firstly, comparison of separation
performance behavior of several popular algorithm in an uncertain communication environment
was conducted. This comparison was done through simulation studies. These simulation
studies suggested that communication failure can cause the performance of these separation
management algorithms to degrade significantly. Secondly, a new type of automated separation
management algorithm that utilizes inter-aircraft communication and a track file manager (or
bank of Kalman filters) is proposed. The proposed separation management algorithm is tested in
a range of flight scenarios involving during periods of communication failure, in both simulation
and flight test (flight tests were conducted as part of the Smart Skies project). The intention of
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the conducted flight tests was to investigate the benefits of using inter-aircraft communication
to provide an extra layer of safety protection in support air traffic management during periods
of failure of the communication network.
8.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we first investigated the impact of measurement uncertainty on the estimated risk
of conflict. Then we compared the separation performance of several algorithms in uncertain
communication environment. Finally, we proposed an inter-aircraft communication and a track
file manager based automated separation management algorithm and demonstrated its ability in
resolving conflicts during a period of central communication failure. A brief summary of the
key contributions and outputs from the research is provided below:
Key contributions:
• Characterized the separation performance in communication failure situations for both
centralized and decentralized separation management approaches.
• Established performance comparisons for impact of communication loss on several exist-
ing automated separation management approaches.
• Identified suitable sensor accuracy requirement from risk of conflict modelling.
• Illustrated the risk of conflict benefits from combining ADS-B and radar measurements.
• Explained the influence of measurement choices and accuracy on estimated risk of con-
flict.
Research Outputs:
• Proposed a new safety augmentation system using a decentralised separation management
system that involves a track file manager, an on-board conflict detection system, and a
separation manager based on a modified satisficing approach.
• Proposed a methodology that considers generic distribution in measurement uncertainty/-
position error model.
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• Proposed a new risk-ratio based approach for assessing the impact of sensor accuracy and
sensor choice on the ability to accurately predict conflicts.
8.2 Future Work
We have identified some possible areas for further consideration and future research:
• In this thesis, we have mainly dealt with the uncertainty from measurements and commu-
nication loss, other classes of uncertainty such as uncertainty from communication delay
is also an interesting area for future research.
• We have shown the impact on estimated risk of conflict from different types of sensor
information, further development of conflict detection that uses the risk ratio concept can
be conducted to possibly improves the performance of separation managements. The
more accurate the estimated risk of conflict, the more likely an ideal conflict detection
system can be designed. (no false alarms and no missed detections).
• We can combine the risk ratio concept based conflict detection with the proposed new
safety augmentation system. We anticipate a better conflict detection performance in
the separation management system, however, the exact relationship between the conflict
detection and overall separation performance is yet not known. Characterizing this rela-
tionship can help determine the optimal implementation of sensor accuracy in particular
scenarios.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Simulation Function Detail Description
Function Name: QUTADACStart
Function Input: Port, Type, Option
Function Output: Nil
Function Description: This function is used to start up the server, and define a port number for
communication. The server will automatically stop on disconnect.
Function Name: QUTADACGetNextAircraftID
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: Aircraft id
Function Description: This function is used to get vaild next aircraft ID from the system. It
output the aircraft ID for separation management to access its information.
Function Name: QUTADACGetFlightplan
Function Input: Aircraft id
Function Output: Flight plan
Function Description: This function uses aircraft ID to access the aircraft flight plan. It get a
flight plan tad from the system for that particle aircraft.
Function Name: QUTADACGetFlightplanElement
Function Input: Aircraft id, Waypoint count
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Function Output: position3d structure
Function Description: This function uses aircraft ID and the current count of waypoint, It will
output the position information for that particle requested waypoint, the position information is
in postion3d structure.
Function Name: QUTADACGetPtad
Function Input: Aircraft id
Function Output: PTAD structure
Function Description: This function uses aircraft ID to access the information about PTAD, it
get a predicted position tad from the system.
Function Name: QUTADACNewCtadStruct
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: CTAD structure
Function Description: This function construct a CTAD, and return a new command tad struc-
ture.
Function Name: QUTADACPushCtad
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: CTAD structure
Function Description: This function push a command tad into the stack.
Function Name: QUTADACSendCtads
Function Input: Aircraft id
Function Output: Nil
Function Description: This function send off queued command Tads for aircraft to execute.
Function Name: QUTADACNewSatadStruct
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: SATAD structure
Function Description: This function returns a new situational awareness tad structure.
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Function Name: QUTADACPushSatad
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: SATAD structure
Function Description: This function push a situational awareness tad into the stack.
Function Name: QUTADACSendSatads
Function Input: Aircraft id
Function Output: Nil
Function Description: This function send off queued situational awareness tads.
Function Name: QUTADACSendSatads
Function Input: Aircraft id
Function Output: Nil
Function Description: This function send off queued situational awareness tads.
Function Name: QUTADACDestroy
Function Input: Nil
Function Output: Nil
Function Description: This function Stop the running server and destroy flight management
data.
A.2 Structure Descriptions
PTAD refers to predicted position information. The structure elements are listed in table A.1.
CTAD refers to command information. The structure element is listed in table A.2. SATAD
refers to situational awareness information. The structure elements are listed in table A.3.
Position3D refers to a structure contains GPS location information. The structure elements
are listed in table A.4. Flight Plan refers to flight plan information of a particular aircraft. The
structure elements are listed in table A.5.
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Table A.1: PTAD Structure
Structure element Data type
Aircraft ID 32-bits integers
Prediction time stamp 64-bits integers
Expected Latency 32-bits floating points
Behaviour 8-bits characters
Current Waypoint 8-bits characters
Position3D Structure
Confidence predicted 8 bits characters
Confidence current 8 bits characters
Height type 8 bits characters
Ground speed 32-bits floating points
Heading 32-bits floating points
Roll 32-bits floating points
Pitch 32-bits floating points
Check sum 32-bits integers
Valid Boolean
Table A.2: CTAD Structure
Structure element Data type
Aircraft ID 32-bits integers
Position3D Structure
Arrival time 64-bits integers
Table A.3: SATAD Structure
Structure element Data type
Aircraft ID 32-bits integers
Aircraft Type 16-bits integers
Time stamp 64-bits integers
Position3D Structure
Heading 64-bits double floating points
Ground speed 32-bits floating points
Uncertainty 32-bits floating points
A.2. STRUCTURE DESCRIPTIONS 107
Table A.4: Position3D Structure
Structure element Data type
Latitude 64-bits double floating points
Longitude 64-bits double floating points
Altitude 32-bits floating points
Table A.5: Flight plan Structure
Structure element Data type
Aircraft ID 32-bits integers
Flight ID 32-bits integers
flight Rules 8-bits characters
Pob 8-bits characters
Equipment 16-bits integers
Ground speed 32-bits floating points
Waypoint count 32-bits unsigned integers
Check sum 32-bits integers
Valid Boolean
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